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The United States and Saudi Arabia share a robust and complex security 
partnership today. This thesis explores the origins and development of U.S.-Saudi 
security cooperation between the late 1920s and early 1960s. During this time, U.S. 
leadership began to incorporate ideological objectives into their once largely analytical 
foreign policy. Scholarly historical literature, first-hand accounts of U.S. officials and 
government documents reveal that what once began as a business relationship in the 
1930s rapidly developed into a security partnership designed to defend against the threat 
of Soviet communism by the 1950s. Initially interested in Saudi Arabia because of its oil, 
the United States began to view the kingdom with increasing geostrategic importance 
during the early Cold War while Saudi Arabia simultaneously benefited from U.S. 
military assistance for protection against regional threats. This thesis provides historical 
evidence and analysis of how U.S.–Saudi security cooperation helped the United States 
reach both its analytical and ideological goals in the past, which suggests that value exists 
in continuing this relationship today, despite the many challenges that it currently faces.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Saudi Arabia share a robust security partnership today that 
incorporates military training, assistance and advice to increase Middle Eastern regional 
security while strengthening diplomatic relations between the two countries.1 Both states 
continue to look to one another for regional leadership and defense assistance against 
existing and future security threats in an increasingly unstable area.2 This thesis examines 
the history of U.S.-Saudi relations and asks: How did the U.S.-Saudi security partnership 
originate and develop from the late 1920s through the early 1960s, and how did this 
relationship help the United States reach its security goals?  
A. IMPORTANCE 
In late 1990, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed to Saudi Arabia 
to take part in Operation Desert Storm in response to Iraqi regional aggression. On 
February 24, 1991, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Hancock, the 
1/327th Infantry Battalion led the division in the execution of the largest helicopter 
assault that had been conducted to that day.3 The purpose of the assault was to establish 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cobra, which would serve as a launching pad for the 
101st to both infiltrate the Euphrates River Valley and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait from 
accessing their supplies along Highway 8 the following day.4 Saudi Arabia provided key 
support for the 101st in the months leading up to the assault in exchange for U.S. military 
protection; throughout the fall of 1990, the 101st provided military defense for Saudi 
Arabia as the division rotated its battalions through King Fahd International Airport 
                                                 
1 “United States Military Training Mission: Home,” United States Military Training Mission, accessed 
October 5, 2014, http://usmtm.org/. 
2 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmidt, “Saudi Arabia Will Grant U.S. Request for Anti-ISIS Training 
Program,” New York Times, September 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/; Colin H. Kahl, Melissa G. 
Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” 
Center for a New American Security, February 2013, 18, 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf. 
3 Frank R. Hancock, “North to the Euphrates: Part One: The Taking of FOB Cobra” (study project, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993), 2, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a265085.pdf. 
4 Hancock, “North,” 1. 
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(Camp Eagle II), which functioned as a major staging point for the operation.5 Saudi 
Arabia played a critical support role for the United States in this operation, and the 
United States reciprocated by offering military defense. 
Camp Eagle II represents just one of many instances during 70 years of 
diplomatic relations in which security interests drove the United States and Saudi Arabia 
to work together. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Middle East’s political, 
economic and security landscape has changed drastically, driving U.S. leaders to rethink 
their conventional diplomatic and military approaches to the region. The current 
instability in the Middle East presents Washington with a vast array of challenges: Al-
Qaeda and other non-state extremist groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
constant regime changes, civil wars, new spikes in Israeli-Palestinian tensions, 
uncertainty over Iran’s nuclear intentions and others. In addition, recent shifts in U.S. 
domestic petroleum production have challenged Saudi Arabia’s traditional role as the 
major oil supplier to the United States, begging the question: Does the United States have 
an economic reason to remain heavily involved in Middle Eastern affairs at all?6 Amidst 
the many challenges that the United States faces in the Middle East today, historic 
raisons d’être for standing U.S. policies and partnerships in the region are often 
downplayed. Neglecting the history of U.S. interaction in the Middle East can prevent 
U.S. leadership from grasping the greater context in which many U.S.-Middle East 
problems lie.    
Today, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to share a complex security 
relationship that includes both militarily strategic and economic elements. For instance, 
the two countries still adhere to the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) 
of 1953, which was designed to protect the “common interests of the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia while strengthening [their] strategic 
partnership.”7 Recently, Saudi Arabia has agreed to allow “moderate Syrian opposition 
                                                 
5 Hancock, “North,” 2, 3. 
6 Summer Said, “Saudi Arabia Cuts All January Crude Oil Prices to U.S., Asia,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 4, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-cuts-all-january-crude-oil-prices-to-u-s-asia-
1417700645. 
7 “United States Military Training Mission: Home.” 
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fighters” to train within its borders as part of a U.S.-led international effort to confront 
and combat the spread of ISIS.8 Economically, the United States signed a trade 
agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2003 that was designed to “enhance the historical bonds 
of friendship and spirit of cooperation between the two countries” and “develop further 
both countries’ international trade and economic interrelationship.”9 Through both 
military and economic cooperation, the United States and Saudi Arabia are critical to 
each other’s security strategies. 
Recent presidential administrations have emphasized the crucial role that Saudi 
Arabia plays in helping the United States reach its security objectives, but many argue 
that the costs of cooperation with the kingdom outweigh the benefits. Human rights abuse 
accusations against the Saudi government have caused members of Congress to question 
the moral justification of continued support for the kingdom.10 Furthermore, today’s 
global security environment is markedly different from the early twentieth century’s, 
when the U.S.-Saudi security relationship began. Threats posed by radical Shi’ites and a 
potentially nuclear Iran, among others issues, have supplanted the West’s fears of Soviet 
communist expansion that dominated the Cold War period, and critics today often accuse 
Saudi Arabia of sponsoring radical Islamic terrorism aimed directly at the United 
States.11  The United States continues to cooperate with Saudi Arabia economically, but 
developments in domestic oil production suggest that foreign oil is losing its hold over 
the U.S. petroleum market. While the aforementioned 2003 trade agreement emphasizes 
the United States’ commitment to maintain strong economic ties to Saudi Arabia, U.S. 
economic activity reveals that the United States is rapidly shedding its dependency on 
foreign oil—in 2014, only 27 percent of petroleum consumed by the United States came 
                                                 
8 Gordon and Schmitt, “Saudi Arabia Will Grant U.S. Request of Anti-ISIS Training Program.” 
9 “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations,” Office of the 
United States Trade Representative: Executive Office of the President, July 31, 2003, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file304_7740.pdf. 
10 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. 
RL33533) (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 2015), summary page, 
http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf. 
11 Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East 
Policy, 13, no. 4 (2006): 39, http://search.proquest.com/docview/59752958?accountid=12702. 
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from foreign countries, which was lowest percentage since 1985.12 Furthermore, the 
United States is incorporating oil into its export economy, and in 2011 U.S. petroleum 
exports outnumbered imports for the first time since 1949.13  Trends suggest that the 
United States will continue to incorporate oil exports as a major part of its economy; in 
2014, the United States exported over 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil, finished petroleum 
products, natural gases and other liquids—400 million barrels more than in 2011.14 Many 
older arguments for strong security and economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia seem to 
be crumbling as a result of changes that are occurring within U.S. foreign policy and 
economic goals. 
Has a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia ever proven to be a valuable asset to 
U.S. national security interests? If so, what historical evidence supports this argument? 
Analyzing the history of U.S.-Saudi security relations can reveal if and how a partnership 
with Saudi Arabia has helped the United States reach its security goals in the Middle East 
in the past, and may suggest how strong diplomatic ties with the kingdom will do so both 
today and in the future. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on the history of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership offers numerous 
explanations as to why this relationship began and how it initially developed. Most 
experts agree that economic motivations—the search for foreign oil by civilian 
companies in the 1930s—initiated interaction between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, but many scholars place different emphasis on the factors that contributed to the 
security aspect of the relationship. To analyze the competing factors that drove the United 
States and Saudi Arabia into security cooperation, it is necessary to break these elements 
down into their historical context. This section explores various historians’ explanations 
                                                 
12 “How Much Oil Consumed by the United States Comes from Foreign Sources?” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, last updated March 12, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32&t=6. 
13 “U.S. Petroleum Product Exports Exceeded Imports in 2011 for First Time in Over Six Decades,” 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, March 7, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5290. 
14 “Exports, Petroleum and Other Liquids,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed April 
10, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbbl_a.htm. 
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and exposes possible gaps in the existing literature by examining three time periods: the 
1920s and 1930s, World War II and the early Cold War.  
1. The 1920s and 1930s 
The first major interaction between the United States and the modern kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia began between U.S. oil businessmen and Saudi Arabia’s first king, King 
Abdel Aziz bin Abdel Rahman al-Faisal al Saud, or Ibn Saud. Oil discoveries in 
southwestern states such as Texas led to an overproduction of domestic oil by U.S. 
companies, making it difficult to understand why U.S. firms began to look for oil 
overseas. It is also particularly unclear how these companies began to cooperate with 
Saudi Arabia. To better understand how initial contact between these two entities resulted 
in a security partnership between the U.S. and Saudi governments, this section compares 
and contrasts literature regarding the United States’ search for foreign oil and Ibn Saud’s 
leadership in the decades prior to World War II.   
a. The Search for Foreign Oil 
Despite an excess in U.S. oil production, many domestic oil companies in the 
1920s and the 1930s suffered, while U.S. companies operating overseas and international 
companies managed to avoid such a fate. In the 1920s and 1930s, both U.S. and 
international oil companies were producing in excess, which drove the price of oil down 
and increased domestic competition, destroying many smaller oil companies and 
threatening the survival of larger ones. As a result, the United States introduced several 
state and federal policies that banned collusive practices during this time. Michael B. 
Stoff contends that the absence of similar regulations in—and the simpler structure of—
the world oil market led international companies to cooperate, ensuring their firms’ 
survival during the global depression. Stoff’s argument explains why the local economy 
and domestic policy would drive U.S. companies to search for oil overseas during the 
Great Depression, but he offers little as to how the United States became interested in 
Saudi Arabia in particular.15   
                                                 
15 Michael B. Stoff. Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign 
Oil, 1941–1947 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 8–9. 
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In her book Thicker than Oil, Rachel Bronson provides more detail on how and 
why the United States began its economic partnership with Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. 
Bronson notes how a British monopoly on Middle Eastern oil reserves in Iraq, Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia resulted in a strict agreement between British and U.S. oil companies 
that discouraged signatories from embarking on new enterprises in the region.16 
Additionally, the agreement prevented companies that refused to sign from operating in 
areas that were known to be profitable at this time such as Iraq. Remaining outside of the 
agreement, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) began to dig and soon struck oil in 
Bahrain in 1932. Convinced that more oil could be found in Saudi Arabia, SOCAL 
entered competition with the British oil companies over negotiations with the Saudi king, 
Ibn Saud, for concessions in Saudi Arabia. After a few years of successful drilling, Ibn 
Saud, driven by both financial debt and a fear of British imperialism, granted SOCAL a 
440,000 square mile oil concession from the Saudi king to CASOC in 1938. While Stoff 
explains why U.S. companies began to search for oil outside of the U.S., Bronson reveals 
how these companies entered an economic partnership with the Saudi Arabia.17 
b. Saudi Leadership 
William A. Eddy suggests in “King Ibn Saud: Our Faith and Your Iron” that 
Saudi leadership played an equally significant role as petroleum did during the early 
phases of U.S.-Saudi relations. Eddy depicts Ibn Saud as both a savvy businessman and a 
charismatic political leader whose efforts brought modernity to a financially poor and 
superstitious population within a relatively short period of time. An astute politician, Ibn 
Saud was able to convince both his own people and the United States government that a 
U.S.-Saudi partnership served the best interests of all parties, and he cleverly reconciled 
technical innovation with religious fundamentalism for even his most apprehensive 
subjects. Overall, Eddy highlights the significant role that Ibn Saud’s personality played 
during early U.S.-Saudi relations, and the scholar illustrates how Saudi leadership helped 
                                                 
16 Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 14-17. 
17 Bronson, Thicker, 16–19. 
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to pave the political and economic paths that the Saudi Kingdom would follow for 
decades.18 
Daniel Silverfarb argues that, while Ibn Saud received significant financial 
backing from Great Britain prior to World War II, the Saudi king also feared the British. 
Ibn Saud depended on the British for financial support, but he also complied with them 
because he dreaded a hostile British reaction should Saudi Arabia reject their support. 
Such a reaction, Ibn Saud feared, could include a British military invasion or British 
inspired internal revolts.  While Silverfarb’s article deals little with U.S.-Saudi interaction 
specifically, he offers additional insight into Ibn Saud’s decision-making processes that 
Eddy fails to mention. Eddy’s article mostly highlights the positive characteristics of Ibn 
Saud’s leadership, but Silverfarb reveals Ibn Saud’s dependency on foreign assistance to 
maintain power while exposing the Saudi king’s distrust of his leading financier: the 
British.19 
2. World War II 
In the years surrounding World War II, the role of national security increased in 
the U.S.-Saudi security relationship. Believing that Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic location 
and oil would assist the United States in achieving its military objectives during the war, 
Washington began to incorporate the kingdom into its national security strategy. U.S. 
administrations took advantage of existing ties built by U.S. oil companies with the Saudi 
government to engage Ibn Saud diplomatically. This section will examine literature that 
discusses how Saudi Arabia’s oil and geographic location caused the U.S. government 
make Saudi Arabia part of its national security strategy during World War II.    
In his book Blood and Oil, Michael T. Klare argues that oil drove U.S.-Saudi 
relations during World War II. He highlights a pivotal document issued by the U.S. 
government relating to U.S.-Saudi relations—the Foreign Petroleum Policy of 1944, 
which called for “the substantial and orderly expansion of production in the Eastern 
                                                 
18 William A. Eddy, “King Ibn Saud: Our Faith and Your Iron,” Middle East Journal 17, no. 3 
(Summer 1963): 257, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4323607. 
19 Daniel Silverfarb, “Britain and Saudi Arabia on the Eve of the Second World War,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 19, no. 4 (October 1983), 410. 
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Hemisphere sources of supply, principally the Middle East.”20 Klare also offers valuable 
insight into the origins of Washington’s role within the private U.S. oil industry; he 
describes how Harold Ickes, Head of the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator (OPC), 
failed to buy out CASOC’s concessions in Saudi Arabia for the federal government—a 
move that had the full backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Navy 
Department. Klare writes that Washington and private U.S. companies retained a strong 
“public-private partnership” in which “the government’s primary role in the partnership 
was to be the maintenance of security and stability in the major oil producing regions.”21 
Klare’s primary argument is that oil is and has always been the driver of U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East. 
Michael Stoff’s book Oil, War, and American Security reveals how the U.S. 
federal government incorporated Saudi oil into its foreign policy between the years 1941 
and 1947. Stoff writes that President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s desire to mobilize private 
American oil companies to support U.S. participation in World War II led to the creation 
of the OPC.22 Roosevelt’s forward-leaning approach toward the federal government’s 
role in the oil industry resulted in a stronger diplomatic relationship between the United 
States and the Saudi kingdom. Concerns over oil depletion in the Western Hemisphere 
and the need for the natural resource to support the American military during World War 
II drove Roosevelt to integrate Saudi Arabia into the Lend-Lease Act in 1943.23 Stoff 
emphasizes how World War II marked the beginning of a new phase in the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship in which “oil joined with pressing strategic incentives,”24 tying economic 
concerns to security interests between the two countries.  
Stoff also introduces another contributing factor to the development of the U.S.-
Saudi security relationship around the time of World War II: geostrategic interests. Stoff 
                                                 
20 Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing 
Dependency on Imported Petroleum (New York: Owl Books and Henry Holt, 2005), 30. 
21 Klare, Blood, 35. 
22 Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign 
Oil, 1941–1947 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 17–18. 
23 Stoff, Oil, 73, 58. 
24 Ibid., 61. 
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emphasizes that the British saw much more value in Saudi Arabia than just its oil. He 
remarks that “the whole Middle East was virtually a landbridge that traversed imperial 
lines of supply and communication. Keeping those lines open was important in time of 
peace; during war, it was essential.”25 Bronson complements Stoff’s argument that Saudi 
Arabia’s location played a significant role in World War II, affirming that the U.S. State 
Department began to press for an airfield in Saudi Arabia because of its position on 
supply routes to Japan.26 While the transportation and weapon systems of the major 
militaries in World War II depended on oil, which Saudi Arabia could provide, the 
kingdom’s significance grew among U.S. leadership because of its geographic location as 
well.    
3. The Cold War 
In the minds of U.S. and Soviet leaders, the Cold War was fought over conflicting 
ideologies as much as it was for power.27 Existing literature offers various explanations 
as to why the United States and Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with each other 
during the early stages of this conflict. While oil remained a major driver of continued 
U.S.-Saudi security cooperation following World War II, many historians argue that 
ideology and geostrategic interests also helped shape the relationship. 
a. Oil 
In “Oil and the American Century,” David S. Painter argues that oil served as the 
primary driver of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship during the Cold War. Like Stoff, 
Painter articulates how foreign oil access became intricately connected to U.S. national 
security, emphasizing the role that oil played in supporting U.S. military transportation 
and weapon systems.28 Noting that the United States led the world in oil production prior 
to its entry into World War II, Painter contends that the United States’ increased 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 44. 
26 Bronson, Oil, 24. 
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dependency on Middle Eastern oil after the war caused Washington to take a vested 
interest in the stability of the region.29 Painter argues that “the importance of oil to U.S. 
goals led the nation to take an active interest in the security and stability of the Middle 
East.”30 Contrary to other scholars, Painter seems to reject the idea that ideology played a 
significant role in the U.S.-Saudi partnership, suggesting that oil remained the primary 
motivation for continued U.S. foreign relations in the Middle East throughout the Cold 
War. 
b. Ideology 
Some scholars argue that ideology played a major role in strengthening the U.S.-
Saudi security relationship following World War II. Rachel Bronson contends that, while 
oil might have provided the initial push for U.S.-Saudi relations, “religious identity” 
played an equally critical role in the ongoing development of this partnership during the 
Cold War.31 Competition between the West and Soviet Russia had a polarizing effect on 
ideologies throughout the world during this time. In the case of the United States and 
Saudi Arabia, shared fears of communism caused both countries to overlook their 
disagreements over religion’s relationship to the state. While freedom of religious 
expression in the United States contrasted with the implementation of Sharia law in Saudi 
Arabia, the Saudi government favored cooperation with the United States because it still 
allowed the practice of any religion; Soviet Russia opposed religion altogether. Bronson 
points out that scholars often ignore the binding role that religion played between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia in the middle of the twentieth century, arguing that the 
hostility toward religion and religious freedom demonstrated by Soviet Russia 
“established a strong foundation that supported close relations [between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia] at the highest political levels for decades.”32 Although Bronson 
mentions that ideology contributed to the early development of the U.S.-Saudi security 
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relationship, her overarching argument in Thicker than Oil is that ideology was just one 
of many contributing factors in the forging of a very complex partnership. 
Peter L. Hahn builds upon Bronson’s argument that ideology played a critical role 
in U.S.-Saudi relations. Although Hahn does not specifically mention Saudi Arabia in his 
article “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,” he highlights the 
significance of ideology in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in the 1950s and 
beyond. “The Eisenhower Doctrine’s precedent of using military force to stop the spread 
of communism outlived the Eisenhower Doctrine,”33 he writes. Hahn argues that 
Eisenhower had the Middle East especially in mind when he was developing the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. The president feared that the decline of British influence in the 
Middle East following the Suez-Sinai War would cause Arab regimes to fall victim to 
Soviet influence, and Eisenhower believed that he “must accept new responsibilities for 
the security of the Middle East.”34 This belief, Hahn argues, led to the creation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.35 Hahn’s article supports Bronson’s argument that ideology helped 
shape the early U.S.-Saudi security relationship by putting it in the greater context of U.S. 
policy in the Middle East in the 1950s. Hahn makes no mention of what might have 
drawn the Saudi government to the ideology of Eisenhower Doctrine however, but 
Bronson possibly fills this gap by suggesting that religion served as a leading motivator. 
c. Geostrategic Interests  
Saudi Arabia and the United States, written by Parker T. Hart, is a first-hand 
account of U.S.-Saudi relations during the mid-twentieth century. Hart served as Consul 
General to Saudi Arabia from 1949 through 1951 and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 
between the years 1961 through 1965, and he held various other high-ranking Foreign 
Service positions throughout the Middle East. Hart’s work provides unique insight into 
government level U.S.-Saudi interaction during an era in which the Cold War, the 
Yemeni Civil War, the Nasser regime, and the escalating Israel-Arab conflict greatly 
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affected U.S.-Saudi security relations. Hart’s work describes, in great detail, lesser-
known historical events in U.S.-Saudi security cooperation that took place under the 
Kennedy administration, including the 1963 talks facilitated by U.S. diplomat Ellsworth 
Bunker and Operation Hardsurface. Saudi Arabia and the United States is valuable to this 
thesis because this primary source provides detailed coverage of events often omitted in 
secondary scholarly works. Hart argues that the security aspects of U.S.-Saudi relations 
are tied directly to global economic interests and deserve heavy consideration by U.S. 
policy makers, describing the partnership as “an alliance of armed force to protect 
responsible custody of the world’s single greatest source of oil.”36 Additionally, Hart 
provides detailed accounts where cooperation between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia resulted in increased regional stability in the Middle East. Through this 
cooperation, the United States managed to offer protection to Saudi Arabia from its 
regional foes, which in turn buttressed Saudi loyalty to the United States and prevented 
Soviet influence on the peninsula.  
The literature presented thus far provides a great amount of information and 
analysis on the events that contributed to the forging and strengthening of the early 
relationship, but it does not draw any conclusion on how this knowledge can be applied 
to issues surrounding U.S.-Saudi cooperation today. To provide such an analysis, this 
thesis will take into account issues that both threaten and strengthen the current 
relationship. I will examine the historical aspect of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership 
and attempt to determine whether any comparable patterns exist between the late 1920s 
through the early 1960s and today. Through analysis of how security cooperation served 
the interests of the two countries in the past, I will explore whether and how such a 
partnership can continue to help the United States and Saudi Arabia reach their security 
goals. 
                                                 
36 Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States (Bloomberg, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1998): 9. 
 13 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The U.S. Constitution offers little guidance regarding the subject of foreign 
alliances and partnerships other than prohibiting U.S. states from entering alliances 
individually.37 In his Farewell Address in 1796, George Washington stated that “it is our 
true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” 
adding, “taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable 
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.”38 While Washington’s Farewell Address does not serve as a governing 
document for the United States, it does reflect the attitudes of many early U.S. leaders 
regarding foreign alliances and partnerships. Historians have called Washington’s 
Farewell Address “the fitting culmination of Federalist writings on the subject of 
government, politics, and foreign affairs,” contending that it contains the “essence” of 
Alexander Hamilton’s thoughts on these subjects in writings such as The Federalist, the 
“Pacificus” and the “Americanus” papers.39  
Norman A. Graebner argues that two competing approaches have helped shape 
U.S. foreign policy since the country was founded: ideological and analytical. In the 
analytical approach, “foreign policy serves the nation,” while the ideological approach 
“views external affairs largely in philosophical and psychological terms.”40 Graebner 
argues that, during the early history of the United States, the central government largely 
favored the analytical approach in its foreign policy, and early U.S. officials tended to 
reject the idea of permanent alliances based solely on ideologies such as “prevailing 
political, social and religious beliefs” largely as a reaction toward European politics of 
that day.41 Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which Graebner 
regards as a period governed by the analytical approach toward U.S. foreign policy, the 
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United States avoided formal alliances, with the exception of the 1778 Treaty of Alliance 
with France. Furthermore, the United States’ experiences in its alliance with France, 
particularly during the XYZ Affair, left the U.S. government apprehensive of future 
formal alliances for a long period of time. The lack of respect shown to the three U.S. 
envoys by French Foreign Minister Marquis de Talleyrand, including his attempt to bribe 
them, played a contributing role in both the dissolution of the United States’ alliance with 
France in 1800 and the United States’ unwillingness to enter into another formal foreign 
alliance with any country until the early twentieth century.42  
Graebner holds that the United States maintained an analytical approach until the 
end of the nineteenth century when President Woodrow Wilson began to incorporate the 
ideals of American exceptionalism and universal self-determination into his foreign 
policy.43 The historian argues that, after Wilson’s presidency, American leaders 
increasingly used an ideological approach when determining foreign policy strategy and 
objectives. The relatively easy military victories of the United States during the end of 
the nineteenth century, such as the Philippine-American War and the Spanish American 
War, allowed U.S. politicians to argue that ideologies such as democratic government 
and freedom of expression were the leading causes of the United States’ success, rather 
than its power.44 Graebner criticizes officials like John Foster Dulles for promoting the 
idea that triumph over the Soviet Union would result from the “spiritual weakness of the 
Soviet system itself,” not diplomatic or political action.45 The lack of diplomatic effort on 
the part of the United States in conjunction with its ideological approach toward 
diplomacy, Graebner argues, resulted in an American foreign policy so hostile toward the 
Soviet Union and China that negotiation between the United States and the two countries 
was nearly impossible by the mid-1950s.46  
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Was the early U.S.-Saudi relationship strictly based on the role of oil in the U.S. 
economy, or did it also help the United States and Saudi Arabia reach their security 
goals? Do Graebner’s claims that ideology drove much of post-Wilsonian U.S. foreign 
policy through the early to mid-twentieth century apply to the U.S.-Saudi security 
relationship? To analyze the origins of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership, this thesis will 
begin by examining the first interactions between the two countries—which were based 
on oil—and explore how the relationship developed within the framework of Graebner’s 
analytical versus ideological approaches to U.S. foreign policy.  
I hypothesize that, in addition to oil, U.S. geostrategic interests also played a 
major role in the development of the early U.S.-Saudi security partnership as the threat of 
Soviet influence in the Middle East increased. Beginning with the first interactions 
between U.S. oil companies and the newly recognized state of Saudi Arabia in the late 
1920s, this thesis examines the origins of the relationship between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia as they relate to national security prior to and during World War II and in 
the early phases of the Cold War. Additionally, I explore what modern-day issues may 
affect ongoing security cooperation between these two countries. 
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II. THE 1920S AND 1930S: OVERSEAS OIL 
Saudi Arabia is one of the United States’ oldest Middle Eastern security partners, 
and the origins of this relationship date back prior to World War II, when the British and 
French still controlled much of the Levant, and Israel was not yet a state. Initially, the 
quest for foreign petroleum by American civilian oil companies brought the United States 
and Saudi Arabia in contact with one another, but the resulting partnership quickly grew 
into one based on much more than oil trade.  
The United States, alongside Great Britain, played a substantial role in both the 
survival and prosperity of Saudi Arabia in the years immediately following the 
Kingdom’s founding by its first king, Ibn Saud. Domestic oil policies, U.S. competition 
with the British and Saudi leadership all contributed to the early formation of the 
complicated relationship that exists between the United States and Saudi Arabia today.  
A. DOMESTIC POLICIES 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship originated in the 1920s when U.S. civilian oil 
companies began to search for oil overseas.47 Both the federal government and the oil 
companies knew that North America had plenty of the natural resource—80 percent of 
the Allies’ oil during World War I came from the United States.48 By the 1920s, many 
members of the U.S. government shared a growing concern that the high rate of 
production would soon strip the continent of most of its oil.49 By 1931, U.S. companies 
were producing oil from the southwestern states at a swift rate, driving the cost per barrel 
down to 10 cents, a relatively low price for that time, which allowed for rapid 
consumption.50 In 1920, the United States provided nearly two-thirds of the world’s oil 
supply, and the rise in automobile use in the United States at this time indicated that the 
demand for oil within U.S. borders was only likely to grow; the number of registered cars 
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in the United States rose from 3.4 million in 1916 to 23.1 million by the late 1920s.51 
State governments tried to curb production through legislation but ultimately failed, and 
companies continued to overproduce, shipping their excess “hot oil” across state lines 
where their state governments had no jurisdiction.52 In response, the federal government 
introduced legislation that prohibited “collusive practices,” but the end result only 
contributed to the success of larger U.S. oil companies operating overseas.53 Many of the 
restrictions imposed on domestically operating U.S. oil companies fell under Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, which was “aimed at restricting production and stabilizing prices.”54 
Increased commercial competition due to overproduction of oil, the complexity of the 
domestic oil business structure and restrictive state and federal policies under the New 
Deal offered more ease to the larger American oil companies operating outside the U.S. 
borders.55 
B. BRITISH COMPETITION 
Although Great Britain relied heavily on the United States during World War I to 
fuel the Royal Navy, the British also held their own oil fields in the Middle East.56 By the 
late 1920s, a British firm called the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) possessed a near 
monopoly on known Middle Eastern oil sites in Iraq, Iran and other states outside of 
Saudi Arabia in the Gulf.57 In 1929, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum 
sought access to Middle Eastern oil sites controlled by the IPC and ultimately appealed to 
Washington for assistance, due to the British government’s reluctance to share 
investments with the American businessmen.58 The U.S. Department of State intervened 
on behalf of the American oil companies by negotiating a settlement called the Red Line 
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Agreement, which awarded 23.75 percent of British oil concessions to Standard Oil of 
New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum.59 The companies did not have to press the State 
Department too hard for assistance in negotiating with the British. The perceived 
ungrateful actions of the European country annoyed Washington, especially after the 
United States had provided substantial energy assistance to the European power during 
the First World War.60 With the help of the federal government, U.S. civilian oil 
companies were able to break the stronghold that the British had held on Middle Eastern 
oil up to that point. The Red Line Agreement is significant in the history of U.S. 
interaction in the Middle East for two reasons. First, the Red Line Agreement resulted in 
the first American oil enterprise in the region. Second, it marked the beginning of a 
partnership between Washington and the American oil companies that continues to shape 
U.S. policy in the Middle East today. 
The IPC forbade its new American partners to search for oil outside of those 
regions delineated by the Red Line Agreement, and, because of this, another U.S. oil 
company, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), chose not to enter the agreement.61 As a 
result, SOCAL was prohibited from drilling in Iraq, which drove the company to look 
south where it soon struck oil in Bahrain in 1932.62 As soon as the IPC received the news 
of SOCAL’s discovery, the British company moved swiftly to exploit it, and both firms 
began to compete for the favor of the new Saudi king, Ibn Saud, since the discovery of oil 
in Bahrain led many to suspect that more oil could be found in nearby Saudi Arabia.63 
Prior to 1932, many believed that most of the Middle East’s oil lay outside of Saudi 
Arabia, and it was upon SOCAL’s discovery that the United States and Great Britain 
began to engage in fierce competition over the Saudi kingdom’s natural resource. 
Before SOCAL’s discovery, Saudi Arabia’s early economy depended largely 
upon religious pilgrimages, which were declining in the early 1930s due to the worldwide 
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effects of the Great Depression. Ibn Saud needed an economic boost to help his new 
kingdom survive. Given the relatively recent colonial history between the Great Powers 
of Europe and the Middle East, the king was highly cautious of making deals with Great 
Britain. As a result, in 1933, the king granted SOCAL 60 year concessions in exchange 
for £35,000 sterling in gold and an additional £20,000 within eighteen months, along with 
other royalties, making SOCAL the first American company to own a chief oil zone in 
the Middle East. Out of the Saudi Arabia-SOCAL concession a new company emerged, 
which titled itself the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC). CASOC 
struck oil at the American oil site Dhahran in 1938.64 The company paid Ibn Saud $1.5 
million for the discovery, and, in turn, Ibn Saud increased CASOC’s concession by 
80,000 square miles to 440,000 square miles—a domain that covered over half of Saudi 
Arabia.65 CASOC began pumping 11,000 barrels per day in 1939, and by 1949 the 
company was producing over 477,000 barrels a day, which was roughly five percent of 
world production at the time.66 Highly suspicious of British imperialism in Saudi Arabia, 
Ibd Saud chose to invest in a lasting partnership with the Americans in the hopes that 
such a deal would both save his failing economy while allowing him to keep political 
autonomy over his kingdom.67 
C. THE GREAT KING 
Saudi Arabia’s oil fields provided the conditions to turn Saudi Arabia into a 
wealthy country; but like many other developing Middle Eastern states in the twenty and 
twenty-first centuries, natural resources benefited a country only to the extent that its 
leadership knew how to use them. Ibn Saud was a shrewd businessman and a brilliant 
politician. Not only did the Saudi king have a thorough understanding of international 
politics and Saudi Arabia’s strengths and weaknesses within that world, but he also 
understood his people and had an exceptional talent for leading through persuasion, 
rather than coercion. 
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While a visit to the modern cities of Jeddah or Riyadh today might not make it 
readily apparent, the newly formed kingdom of the House of Saud in the early to mid-
twentieth century was comprised of a largely uneducated population who lacked basic 
technical skills. Saudi inhabitants at this time practiced some form of Islam, but a level of 
superstition also permeated their belief system, and many people believed that technology 
was inherently evil.68 Resistance toward modernization presented a major challenge for 
Ibn Saud as he tried to introduce technology and scientific developments into Saudi 
society. 
Recognizing the importance of spirituality in his people’s lives and believing that 
modernization was key to the survival of his kingdom, Ibn Saud cleverly devised ways to 
reconcile Islam, technological innovation and active participation in Western trade in a 
way that many Middle Eastern countries’ leaders still struggle to do today. For instance, 
Ibn Saud encouraged the incorporation and use of the telephone in the Saudi government, 
hoping that it would strengthen the crown’s central authority and help eliminate 
lawlessness. Many of Saudi Arabia’s religious leaders opposed the use of the device 
however, believing that when people used the telephone, Shaytan (Satan) and the djinn 
transported human voices through the air.69 To allay his subjects’ anxieties, Ibn Saud had 
two imams, one in Mecca and the other in Riyadh, read from the Qur’an to each other 
over the telephone. The witnesses who heard the Qur’an through the telephones remained 
convinced of the evil nature of the device until Ibn Saud directly referenced the religious 
text to support his own position, arguing “does it not say that the devil and his cohorts 
cannot pronounce even one word of our Holy Book? This miracle therefore is not of the 
devil but of nature.”70 Ibn Saud’s imagination and leadership skills enabled him to 
convince his people to accept other technology as well, such as the camera, which many 
Muslims believed promoted idolatry.71 The king’s empathy toward his subjects’ religious 
beliefs, his astute recognition of the benefits of modernization and his strong leadership 
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skills allowed him to bring many technological advancements into Saudi Arabia without 
forcing the Saudi people to give up their religious beliefs. 
Ibn Saud made immense contributions to the development of Saudi Arabia. He 
initiated a period of modernization in the mid-1940s that revolutionized the Arabian 
Peninsula. Between the years 1944 and 1946, the country took possession of its first 
piano, deep-freeze refrigerator and airplane.72 In 1951, the Arabian American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO), previously SOCAL, completed its construction of a royal railway 
that connected Riyadh and Jeddah to the Persian Gulf, which cost over $70 million to 
build—a sum that was taken out of the king’s own oil payments.73 It took the passing of a 
generation, however, to relieve the country of its superstitious apprehensions toward 
scientific advancement, but, even then, the change that Ibn Saud initiated came rapidly.74 
Ibn Saud was largely responsible not only for the initiation but also the development of 
the early U.S.-Saudi security relationship. His conviction that Saudi Arabia must 
modernize and become a player in the global economy provided the leadership that the 
United States needed in both an economic and security partner in the Middle East.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Oil drove the early interaction between the United States and Saudi Arabia, but, 
while Ibn Saud personally handled the Saudi aspect of this relationship, U.S. oil 
companies, rather than the U.S. government, led the American side. The major 
contributing factors to the SOCAL’s success in Saudi Arabia include the relative 
simplicity of the international oil market, British control over many of the known oil 
reserves in the Middle East and Ibn Saud’s leadership skills and business acumen. 
Furthermore, Ibn Saud’s ability to manage and cultivate this relationship—both in his 
dealings with SOCAL and through his handling of domestic religious opposition—
demand credit for the partnership’s survival and success in its early years. During the 
1920s and 1930s, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States remained 
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largely business-like in nature and would continue to do so until the United States 
integrated Saudi Arabia into its national security strategy in World War II.   
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III. WORLD WAR II: OIL, LOCATION AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
Until World War II, most of the dialogue between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States occurred between Ibn Saud and the executives at SOCAL. This aspect of the 
relationship changed during World War II, when Washington began to regard the oil and 
geographic location of the Middle East with increasing value to national security. 
Additionally, unrealistic financial demands by Ibn Saud on SOCAL led the company to 
appeal to Washington for assistance, which gave the federal government an open door 
through which to assert its authority in the business partnership. As the war drew to an 
end, competition between the United States and Great Britain for influence over the Saudi 
kingdom increased, causing both countries to make aggressive diplomatic attempts to 
court a strong partnership with the king. Suspicious of British imperialism, Ibn Saud 
showed favoritism toward the United States. 
World War II changed the fundamental nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship 
because it added a security aspect to a once primarily economic based partnership. It also 
set many standards for the future of how Washington would interact with U.S. companies 
that operated overseas. This section will explore the major themes of the development of 
the U.S.-Saudi security relationship during World War II: Saudi Arabia’s oil and location 
as a U.S. security concern, Ibn Saud’s relationship with the British and U.S.-British 
competition. 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY: THE LEND-LEASE ACT AND THE FOREIGN 
PETROLEUM POLICY 
In addition to being a strong leader, Ibn Saud was also a shrewd businessman. He 
recognized the spike in value that CASOC’s discovery had afforded Saudi Arabia, and, 
by 1940, he was fully exploiting it. In that year, the British, attempting to maintain Saudi 
support and stability in World War II, resumed subsidy payments of roughly £400,000 to 
the Saudi king. Ibn Saud claimed that he required more to keep his kingdom from 
collapsing though. In addition to British financial support and $3 million already 
contracted by CASOC, Ibn Saud demanded an additional $3 million from the American 
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company for 1941. Around this time, CASOC’s annual royalties were roughly $1.5 
million—a sum that made it nearly impossible to meet Ibn Saud’s growing demands.75  
With little other options, CASOC appealed to Washington for help. Representing 
CASOC on a trip to Washington, DC, in April 1941, James Andrew Moffett made a face-
to-face appeal to President Roosevelt for financial assistance in meeting Ibn Saud’s high 
demands.76 Politically, Roosevelt’s hands were tied since the United States had not yet 
entered the war and Saudi Arabia was a neutral country that still operated heavily under 
the influence of the British Empire—such an agreement would have drawn strong 
objections from Congress.77 Moffett framed his request to Washington by arguing that 
Saudi Arabia, and particularly Ibn Saud, was the sole source of stability in the region.78 
Moffett also suggested that the British increase their financial support to Saudi Arabia as 
well, and, although his plan denied the British access to more Saudi oil, the British 
government favored the proposal. Great Britain’s needs for oil were already satisfied 
through concessions elsewhere in the Middle East, but the British government saw 
Moffett’s plan as a way to garner more political support and popularity from the resentful 
Saudi government through an Anglo-American-Saudi contract.79 Although Roosevelt 
also showed receptiveness to aspects of Moffett’s plan, fears of a political backlash from 
isolationists in Congress precluded the president from acting. CASOC continued to press 
for federal support during 1941 and 1942, but domestic politics prevented Roosevelt from 
committing government assistance to CASOC during the first few years of the war.80 
Despite its initial reluctance to work with CASOC, Washington began to view 
Saudi Arabia with increasing significance as the war developed.81 The kingdom’s 
location along supply routes into Russia led State Department officials to hold Middle 
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Eastern stability and access to Saudi Arabia’s airfields as critical elements of the war 
effort.82 As an act of good will toward Ibn Saud for his assistance, Roosevelt promised 
agricultural assistance to the king in January 1942, and, in May the United States opened 
a legation in Jeddah.83 Roosevelt still remained hesitant over Moffett’s plan, however. 
CASOC’s relentlessness finally paid off when the company gained the ear of 
Petroleum Coordinator and Secretary of the Interior Ickes, who wanted the United States 
to explore foreign oil options out of a concern for depletion of U.S. sources.84 With 
Ickes’ help, CASOC convinced the president of what it considered to be the importance 
of Saudi Arabian oil in U.S. interests, and, on February 16, 1943, Roosevelt integrated 
Saudi Arabia into the Lend-Lease Act, stating that “the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to 
the defense of the United States.”85 The Lend-Lease Act was a program through which 
the United States provided nearly $50 billion dollars of assistance to over 30 countries 
during World War II and was “designed to serve America’s interest in defeating Nazi 
Germany.”86 In July of that year, the United States elevated its chargé d’affaires to 
Minister Resident at Jeddah.87 Roosevelt’s extension of the Lend-Lease Act to Saudi 
Arabia demonstrates that the president had by now come to see the kingdom as an 
integral part of U.S. national security during World War II.  
In 1944, the Roosevelt administration introduced the Foreign Petroleum Policy of 
the United States, which called for the “substantial and orderly expansion of production 
in Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally in the Middle East.”88 This policy 
resulted from the push from Ickes and others in Washington to practice oil conservation 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, and it played a major role in refocusing U.S. oil 
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interests within the Middle East.89 Saudi Arabia’s role in the United States’ security 
strategy increased during World War II, partly because of its geographic location and 
partly because of its oil; Saudi Arabia’s geographic location added value to its oil, in the 
eyes of Washington. Both the Lend-Lease Act and Roosevelt’s Foreign Petroleum Policy 
reveal how Saudi Arabia’s oil and location had become intricately connected in 
Roosevelt’s security strategy during this time. 
Many members of the Roosevelt administration wanted to push for even more 
federal involvement in the oil business to ensure the U.S. government’s access to Saudi 
resources. To guarantee the federal government’s access to Saudi Arabian oil, Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull recommended the creation of a government-run oil company called 
the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC). Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum 
Coordinator Ickes tried to expand on the idea and even proposed that the PRC buy out 
CASOC’s current reserves.90 The plan ultimately failed, however, as a result of 
combined resistance from CASOC, the British government and U.S. Congress. Ickes’ 
PRC proposal marked the height of American government control over U.S. oil 
commerce in the Middle East. Since the failure of Icke’s proposal, Washington has 
shared a “public-private partnership”91 with the big American oil companies in which the 
central government has provided the “maintenance of security and stability in the major 
oil-producing regions.”92  
Both the PRC and the Lend-Lease program served as significant milestones in the 
development of U.S. federal interaction with American commercial oil companies in 
Saudi Arabia. While the failure of the PRC helped define U.S. oil companies’ 
relationship to the federal government, the Lend-Lease Program highlights a major 
milestone in the origins in the security relationship between the U.S. government and 
Saudi Arabia.93 
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B. IBN SAUD AND THE BRITISH  
As the U.S.-Saudi security relationship rapidly developed during World War II, 
Great Britain also sought to maintain its existing influence over Saudi Arabia. Besides 
security interests during World War II, Saudi Arabia’s geographic location offered 
proximity to other Middle Eastern countries in which the British also had investments. 
Additionally, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb provided Saudi Arabia access to 
the Indian Ocean where Great Britain still held many international political and economic 
interests.94 Ibn Saud remained suspicious of the British despite the amount of financial 
support he received from the European country. The Saudi king generally preferred to 
work with Americans, since he believed they were less prone to colonialism and that their 
interests were mostly business oriented.95 While the relationship that Ibn Saud had with 
the United States was of a strictly business nature until World War II, he relied heavily 
on the British for political support and security assistance throughout the early twentieth 
century and continued to do so during the war.  
In the years leading up to World War II, the British became progressively anxious 
about their ability to rely on Saudi Arabia for support should Great Britain decide to 
fight. The British relentlessly tried to calm Ibn Saud’s suspicions of a colonialist plot 
through several actions, one of which included emphasizing a “pro-Arab and anti-
Zionist” foreign policy.96 In the spring of 1939, Great Britain issued a white paper that 
restricted Jewish immigration into, and Jewish land purchases in, Palestine, and it 
allowed Palestine to “become an independent state under the control of its Arab majority” 
after ten years.97 Great Britain also offered Ibn Saud a “quasi-guarantee” that the British 
military would protect Saudi Arabia should the country come under attack “because the 
two governments would be fighting against a common enemy and because Britain had a 
vital interest in preserving unimpeded transit for ships moving through the Red Sea.”98 
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Finally, the British government provided the Saudi king financial aid to rebuild the Hijaz 
railway and other projects and a “large credit” for weapons purchases.99  
Among the many political and financial attempts by the British to appease Ibn 
Saud, the Saudi king’s leading motivation for supporting the British and the Allies during 
World War II was security.100  Ibn Saud maintained an official position of neutrality 
during World War II, but many of the king’s actions demonstrated his support for the 
Allies. For instance, Ibn Saud twice refused to admit the German Minister Fritz Grobba 
during the war, preventing the creation of a German legation in Saudi Arabia.101 
Although the British may not have realized it, by the late 1930s Ibn Saud had begun to 
feel an equal, if not greater, pressure resulting from domestic issues and regional politics 
to keep the British close, while the British continued make efforts to appease the Saudi 
king, albeit unnecessarily. Ibn Saud’s authority within his new kingdom hinged largely 
on a thriving economy, which the Saudis had built primarily on oil exports and religious 
pilgrimages.102 By the late 1930s, Ibn Saud relied heavily on British sea power to keep 
trade lines secure and travel to Saudi Arabia safe and accessible, which were necessary to 
maintain a steady flow of oil exports, food imports, and religious tourist activity.103 
Moreover, Ibn Saud worried that a Saudi Arabian snub of British support could result in a 
hostile British reaction; the British had the capability to blockade Saudi ports, limiting 
Saudi Arabia’s access to food and trade, and the British possessed bases throughout the 
Middle East from which they could easily launch air strikes on Saudi cities.104 
Additionally, regional enemies—the French-backed Hashemites from Transjordan and 
Iraq, the Shi’ites in the Hasa region and recently conquered Arab tribes that Ibn Saud 
constantly worked to keep subdued—surrounded the king, and he depended on British 
political and military assistance to maintain his power.105 Overall, Ibn Saud did not relish 
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his relationship with Great Britain, but his political astuteness allowed him to recognize 
British support as an unavoidable necessity for the sustainment of his new kingdom. 
C. THE UNITED STATES GAINS FAVOR 
Near the end of the World War II, Washington grew concerned that Great 
Britain’s influence over the Saudi king would jeopardize the economic and security 
advancements that the United States had made in the region up to that point. The Saudi 
Arabian economy continued to suffer at the end of the war, primarily because of the 
war’s effect on Saudi trade and travel, and, in some areas of the Kingdom, the poor 
economic situation was so extreme that it resulted in starvation.106 Many government 
officials feared that the collapse of the Saudi economy could destroy any future plans that 
the United States had for the U.S.-Saudi oil trade.  
In January 1945, Wallace Murray, head of the Office of Near Eastern and African 
Affairs, wrote in a top-secret letter to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “if the 
Saudi Arabian economy should break down and political disintegration ensue, there is a 
danger that either Great Britain or Soviet Russia would attempt to move into Saudi 
Arabia to preserve order and thus prevent the other from doing so.”107 Murray shared 
Ickes’ concern that the United States would deplete North and South American oil 
reserves, and he emphasized the need to protect and continue to invest in the Saudi 
Arabian oil fields that were already part of the United States’ concessions.108 Between 
the years of 1940 and 1945, Great Britain provided the Saudi government almost $40 
million to maintain a strong diplomatic relationship between the two countries.109 In 
1945, Murray suggested that the U.S. government provide up to $57 million over the next 
five years in addition to the $13.4 million already promised by ARAMCO, which 
CASOC had renamed itself as in 1944, to compete with British influence over Saudi 
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Arabia.110 The U.S. Navy showed a particularly strong interest in Saudi oil near the end 
of World War II, and, not only did naval leadership back Murray’s position, but key 
naval figures argued that the United States should continue to expand oil concessions in 
Saudi Arabia and other foreign places solely for U.S. security interests. Secretary of the 
Navy James Forrestal wrote in 1944 that “the bargaining power of the United States in 
international conferences involving vital materials like oil … will depend in some degree 
upon the retention … of such oil reserves,” and “the active expansion of such holdings is 
very much to be desired.”111 While the United States and Great Britain had generally 
shared a cooperative approach toward Saudi Arabia during World War II, toward the end 
of the war the two Western countries began to engage in diplomatic competition for Ibn 
Saud’s favor. 
Arguably, Washington was overly concerned about losing influence in Saudi 
Arabia due to Ibn Saud’s apprehension toward working with the British. Nonetheless, the 
federal government pressed aggressively forward with a policy to court Ibn Saud’s favor 
over the European power. On February 12, 1945, President Roosevelt met Ibn Saud in 
person for the first time onboard the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez 
Canal.112 The meeting resulted in several agreements between the U.S. and Saudi 
governments, many of which were already works in progress, including American access 
to Saudi Arabian ports, consent for the United States to build military bases in Saudi 
Arabia and Saudi permission for ARAMCO to construct the Trans-Arabian pipeline that 
would stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea.113 While the meeting was 
largely a success, the President was unable to persuade Ibn Saud to change his views on 
the creation of the state of Israel, and Ibn Saud remained steadfast in his conviction that 
“it was the Germans, not the Arabs, who should pay” for the Holocaust.114 A final clause 
of the agreement between the two leaders, and possibly the most significant to Ibn Saud, 
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consisted of President Roosevelt’s promise that “America would not seek to occupy 
Saudi soil as the British had occupied so many of Saudi Arabia’s neighboring 
countries.”115 The meeting onboard the USS Quincy demonstrates how World War II had 
quickly transformed a business relationship between American oil companies and Ibn 
Saudi into a security partnership between the governments of both states. The meeting 
between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud was to have a profound impact on Saudi 
Arabia’s immediate future, propelling it from a struggling Middle Eastern state whose 
livelihood depended largely on religious tourism to an oil-based economic powerhouse. 
By 1948, the production of Saudi oil had risen from 21.3 million barrels in 1945 to 142.9 
million barrels; by 1952 Saudi Arabia would produce over 300 million barrels.116   
Ibn Saud died in 1953. Under his leadership, Saudi Arabia had transformed from 
a land wrought with tribal violence and little money to a kingdom courted by the world’s 
strongest powers for political, economic and security cooperation. While to Western eyes 
Ibn Saud’s high demands on the United States and Great Britain may cause him to appear 
greedy, his business and political skills were arguably exactly what Saudi Arabia needed 
to bring it into the twentieth century. Yet Ibn Saud sought to draw the line at security 
cooperation during his reign by refusing to allow U.S. foreign policy to shape his 
domestic and regional policies, including his stance on Israel. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Prior to World War II, the relationship between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia was largely economic. During the early 1940s, the U.S. government began to 
view Saudi Arabia’s geographic location and oil with significant value in the war effort, 
causing Washington to incorporate Saudi Arabia into its national security strategy. The 
introduction of the Foreign Petroleum Policy was a major contributor to this shift in 
Washington’s interest in Saudi Arabia’s oil and geographic location. The federal 
government’s new approach toward Saudi Arabia came at the relief of CASOC 
executives, who were struggling to meet Ibn Saud’s increasing financial demands. 
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Already receiving financial and military support from the British, Ibn Saud grew 
increasingly receptive toward working with the U.S. government because he believed that 
their intentions were absent of imperialistic motivations, unlike the British. By the end of 
the war, the fundamental nature of the relationship between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia had changed. The business relationship between U.S. oil companies and Ibn Saud 
had transformed into a diplomatic partnership with where the U.S. government replaced 
CASOC as the lead negotiator for the United States. 
The new partnership that emerged at the conclusion of World War II suggests that 
Roosevelt took a largely analytical approach toward Saudi Arabia, since it was largely 
based on security needs. Access to Saudi oil allowed Washington to support the 
expanding oil-based infrastructure of its military without tapping into its own reserves. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s geographic proximity to the United States’ new emerging 
adversary, the Soviet Union, offered the United States significant geostrategic 
advantages. This partnership also proved valuable to Saudi Arabia’s security interests as 
well; the money that the United States promised Saudi Arabia helped Ibn Saud to quell 
tribal conflict and bring his country out of the economic depression that occurred in the 
1930s. The culminating meeting between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud onboard the 
USS Quincy highlights one point of contention that will continue to permeate the 
partnership through the next several decades, however. The United States saw a 
diplomatic partnership with Saudi Arabia as means to exert its own foreign policy 
objectives on regional Middle Eastern affairs, while the Saudi monarch strived to keep 
the relationship based solely on mutual economic and security interests. In the meeting 
onboard the USS Quincy, the topic was over Israel, although this one instance marks the 
beginning of a pattern of dialogue that will continue to plague the partnership over a 
range of topics. The security needs of the United States, which included oil and 
geostrategic interests, drove the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
during the war, which, again, reveals that Roosevelt took a mostly analytical approach to 
Saudi Arabia. As the threat of Soviet communism grows during the Cold War, however, 
a new factor soon begins to contribute to the ongoing development of the U.S.-Saudi 
security partnership: ideology. 
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IV. THE COLD WAR ERA: PROTECTING SECURITY 
INTERESTS WITHIN AN IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia began during 
World War II. Although interaction between the two countries started as a business 
partnership between civilian oil companies and the Saudi monarchy, during the war, the 
U.S. federal government began to incorporate Saudi Arabia into its national security 
strategy. Saudi Arabia’s oil and geographic location increased in importance in U.S. 
foreign policy at the conclusion of the war when the once dominant western European 
states, namely France and Great Britain, began to lose influence in the region while 
Soviet Russia began to expand. Since a large portion of Middle Eastern concessions held 
by U.S. civilian oil companies were in Saudi Arabia at the end of World War II, the U.S. 
government continued to leverage this economic relationship to support U.S. security 
interests in the Eastern Hemisphere against the communist threat.  
During the Cold War, ideological issues such as communism and Arab 
nationalism played a role in U.S.-Saudi security relations. While these ideological issues 
affected U.S.-Saudi relations, to say that U.S. leaders during the early Cold War took an 
entirely analytical or ideological approach toward Saudi Arabia would oversimplify U.S. 
foreign policy during this period. Interaction between the House of Saud and Presidents 
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy reveals that these presidents integrated both 
approaches into their foreign policy. In addition to communism and Arab nationalism, 
major issues that affected U.S.-Saudi security relations during the early Cold War 
included the following: shared fears of Soviet military aggression, the creation of an 
Israeli state in the Middle East, growing financial demands from the House of Saud, Ibn 
Saud’s death, Middle Eastern regional politics and domestic politics in both countries. 
This section will explore how these themes affected the U.S.-Saudi security relationship 
during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. 
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A. PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
President Truman picked up where Roosevelt left off in his efforts to incorporate 
Saudi Arabia into the United States’ security strategy. With the emergence of Soviet 
Russia as the new great threat to U.S. security, Truman’s attempts to establish a greater 
U.S. military presence in the kingdom reveal that he saw geostrategic value in the 
kingdom, while access to Saudi oil also remained a priority. Both states opposed 
communism, which helped Truman’s efforts in Saudi Arabia; however, other issues, such 
as new Saudi concerns of American imperialism, Israel and increasing financial demands 
from Ibn Saud posed challenges for Truman. This section will cover three major issues 
that dominated the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic dialogue during 
Truman’s presidency: Soviet expansion and communism, Israel and Ibn Saud’s 
increasing financial demands.117  
1. The Soviet Threat 
In 1946, a year after President Harry S. Truman entered office, 77 percent of 
Europe’s oil supply came from Western Hemisphere.118 While Truman sought to shift 
this balance to the Eastern Hemisphere because he was concerned about the depletion of 
western oil, he also prioritized U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations out of a fear of Soviet 
expansion in the toward the west. Decreasing British influence in the Middle East and a 
largely isolationist Congress at the conclusion of World War II left President Truman 
facing an uphill battle.119 Additionally, during this time, the aggressiveness with which 
the Truman administration pursued a military presence in Saudi Arabia roused suspicions 
of U.S. imperialistic motives among the Saudi government. Without a doubt, Truman’s 
primary foreign policy concern was Soviet expansion, and Roosevelt had already opened 
the door for positive U.S.-Saudi relations; Truman hoped to build upon his predecessor’s 
work and incorporate Saudi Arabia into his security strategy against the Soviet Union.  
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a. Religion and Ideology 
An often-overlooked aspect of the immediate post-World War II relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States was the role of religion and ideology. While 
the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides freedom of religion and 
expression within U.S. borders, contradicts the theocratic nature of the Saudi 
government, the House of Saud viewed the United States’ championing of religious 
freedom as more compatible with Sharia law than Soviet communism, which rejected 
religion entirely. Rachel Bronson argues that, prior to the collapse of the USSR, the 
United States demonstrated little concern over “Saudi Arabia’s extensive proselytizing of 
a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam … because it had an anti-Communist 
justification.”120 Likewise, the threat that communism held to the House of Saud and its 
Islamic kingdom caused the Saudi government to look past some of the glaring 
differences between core American ideology regarding religious freedom and Saudi 
Arabia’s own strict implementation of Sharia law. In this regard, the House of Saud 
viewed the United States not as an ideal partner but as a lesser evil when considering the 
role of religion in its foreign policy.121 The shared fears of communism among U.S. and 
Saudi leadership allowed Saudi Arabia to see more similarities in U.S. and Saudi 
ideology than what truly existed. Regardless, these mutual concerns allowed President 
Truman to continue assistance to Saudi Arabia after he announced the Truman Doctrine, 
which called for the United States to “provide political, military and economic assistance 
to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces.”122 
Despite his commitment to preserve democracy, the Truman administration continued to 
increase aid to the theocratic kingdom, partly because of the polarizing effect that 
communism had on the international community.  
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b. Geostrategic Interests 
In addition to ideology, the Saudi government increased its security cooperation 
with the Truman administration because both governments viewed the Soviet Union as a 
formidable security threat. One of these advancements—Dhahran Airfield—provided the 
United States with a new geostrategic advantage, although without the Truman 
administration’s persistence, particularly from the State Department, this airfield 
probably would not have been built. In addition to the completion of the U.S. airfield in 
Dhahran in 1946, which was “particularly important as a staging point in the event there 
was trouble with the Russians,” Truman established the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement (MDAA) of 1951 with Saudi Arabia. The MDAA was a five-year agreement 
that provided U.S. military training support to Saudi Arabia and resulted in the creation 
of the United States Military and Training Mission (USMTM) of 1953, which remains a 
major pillar for U.S.-Saudi military relations today. President Truman’s successes came 
with a price for U.S.-Saudi relations, however. For instance, the mere idea of a U.S. 
occupied airfield at Dhahran re-enforced growing Saudi suspicions of U.S. imperialistic 
motives in the 1940s. The Saudi government saw little reason for a continued U.S. 
military presence now that World War II had ended, and the proposal gave Ibn Saud 
concern about the future nature of U.S.-Saudi relations.123 While Ibn Saud still preferred 
a partnership with the United States against the Soviet threat, the increased U.S. military 
presence in Saudi Arabia concerned the king. 
The airfield also caused controversy within the U.S. federal government. Initially 
proposed by the War Department, Dhahran Airfield became a topic of contention within 
the Truman administration shortly following the end of World War II. While an airbase 
on the Saudi Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf gave the United States a solid strategic 
foothold in the region, many U.S. officials, including leadership within the War 
Department, agreed with the Saudi government that an airfield in Dhahran was no longer 
necessary. Originally, Ibn Saud had rejected the proposal, but the State Department, 
believing the presence of a U.S. airbase in Saudi Arabia to be a positive step in U.S.-
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Saudi Arabian relations, continued to push for its construction. Ibn Saud accepted the 
airfield’s creation only after the United States promised a large sum of monetary aid 
aimed specifically at improving Saudi Arabia’s struggling economy. At the time, the idea 
of having U.S. military aircraft operate in Saudi Arabia was so controversial that the two 
countries agreed to call the project an airfield, rather than airbase, to prevent any 
undesired misperception of American imperialism. During the Cold War, Truman made 
significant geostrategic advancements in the Eastern Hemisphere through Saudi Arabia’s 
cooperation, but these gains had a negative effect on the relationship between the two 
countries because they caused the Saudi government to question the United States’ 
motives in Saudi Arabia.124    
2. Israel 
While many of Truman’s speeches reveal that he believed in the morality of a 
pro-Israeli U.S. foreign policy, the President backed Israel’s creation for more than this 
reason; he also saw geostrategic value in the Jewish state.125 In previous years, President 
Roosevelt had retained a largely vague position on the creation a Jewish state in 
Palestine, but he did send a very clear message to Ibn Saud that the United States would 
include the Arab world when making any major decisions about Israel. In a letter from 
Roosevelt to the Saudi king, the president stated, “there should be no decision altering the 
basic situation in Palestine without ‘full consultation’ with the Arab states.”126 In 1945, 
President Truman assured Ibn Saud that he would adhere to Roosevelt’s promise, and, 
while Truman expressed his desire to allow Jewish immigrants into Palestine, he also 
released an official statement saying that a Jewish presence in Palestine “would have to 
be worked out with the British and the Arabs for a Jewish State.”127 While Truman was 
more open regarding his position on the creation of Israel than Roosevelt, he was similar 
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to his predecessor in that he had given the Saudi government the impression that the 
United States would include Saudi Arabia on any major decisions regarding the issue. 
On October 4, 1946, however, Truman issued statement that argued for a “viable 
Jewish State … in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine” to 
which Ibn Saud quickly responded with a letter to the White House that expressed his 
severe disappointment in the President since Truman had apparently sent no prior notice 
to the Saudi king about the issuance of this statement.128 Truman was not overly 
concerned about the King’s reaction, and he believed the Saudi state was already too 
economically dependent on the United States to turn against Washington based on the 
Israeli controversy alone.129 Additionally, Ibn Saud’s fear of Soviet expansion continued 
to drive the king further into the U.S. security embrace regardless of Truman’s position 
on Israel; Ibn Saud even tried to use the issue as a bargaining tool for more security deals. 
In 1948, the king requested “a stronger U.S. guarantee against Soviet hostility to Saudi 
Arabia because of Saudi support of American policies in the Middle East.”130 Ibn Saud’s 
expressed offense over Truman’s actions on October 4 was possibly over-exaggerated. 
Arguably, the Saudi king cared more about being a leading voice in the Arab community 
than the carving out of a small state that did not share a border with his own kingdom, 
meaning that his protests against the creation of Israel were mostly meant to impress the 
Arab world. Whether or not Ibn Saud cared as much about preventing the creation of 
Israel as he said he did, one thing is for certain: the king’s response to Truman’s 
statement—using the United States’ backing of Israel to appeal for increased military 
support—suggests that Ibn Saud valued the United States’ protection from the Soviet 
Union more than he cared about the United States’ backing of a Jewish state in the 
Middle East. 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 972. 
130 Ibid. 
 41 
3. Financing a Kingdom 
Despite Saudi Arabia’s growing economy, Ibn Saud claimed that he was still 
struggling to meet all of the financial requirements necessary to maintain power over his 
large kingdom, which included paying off tribal leaders for their continued loyalty to the 
House of Saud.131 The king’s assertion remained a topic of debate among Congress; 
many members believed that the Saudi king squandered his money and was becoming 
greedy.132 Regardless, in 1950, the Korean War intensified Truman’s concerns over 
Soviet expansion, pushing Saudi Arabia’s position as a western buffer state to the 
forefront of Truman’s foreign policy.133  The president was willing to take a significant 
hit in the eyes of Congress and many other members of the federal government to 
maintain the support and favor of Ibn Saud.134 In the previous year, ARAMCO had paid 
the U.S. government more money in taxes than it gave to the Saudi government; the U.S. 
government collected $43 million in tax money from ARAMCO, while Ibn Saud 
received only $39.1 million.135 This disparity frustrated the Saudis, who felt that the U.S. 
government was cheating the House of Saud out of their financial dues. The State 
Department sided with the Saudi government, and they pushed for an adjustment in 
revenue distribution that that they argued was necessary to maintain good U.S.-Saudi 
relations.136   
In 1950, the Truman administration enacted the 50/50 Agreement, which dictated 
that half of ARAMCO’s revenues go to the Saudi Arabian government and the other half 
go directly to ARAMCO. Backed mostly by the State Department, and largely opposed 
by Congress, the administration hoped that the 50/50 Agreement would smooth over 
some of the major points of tension between the two states, particularly in Palestine.137 
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Additionally, in 1950 ARAMCO also began to use the American tax code help lighten 
the financial burden that Ibn Saud’s increasing demands were placing on the company. 
The American tax code allowed U.S. companies operating in a foreign country to deduct 
the amount of taxes that the foreign country charged from the taxes that the company 
paid to the U.S. government. The U.S. government had enacted the American tax code in 
1918 as part of the Internal Revenue Code to encourage U.S. companies to expand into 
foreign enterprises without fear of being double taxed, but the code was originally 
intended for use in more developed countries that actually taxed its companies—Ibn Saud 
demanded royalties from ARAMCO, not taxes. Yet, with the help of the State 
Department, which was eager to keep the Saudi king happy, ARAMCO managed to 
convince Ibn Saud to change the verbiage of his demands from royalties to taxes.138 
The State Department’s manipulation of the tax code and the enactment of the 
50/50 Agreement infuriated Congress since these things allowed the Saudi government to 
receive money that Congress believed rightfully belonged to the U.S. government. 
Moreover, these policies forced American taxpayers to pay the difference. Despite 
Congress’s frustrations, the State Department managed to keep Ibn Saud content by 
continuing to fill the Saudi purse at the U.S. government’s and taxpayers’ expense—in 
1951, the federal government received only $6 million from ARAMCO in taxes, while 
ARAMCO paid the Saudi government $110 million.139 The Truman administration, 
against the wishes of Congress, demonstrated how important it viewed Saudi Arabia’s 
role in U.S. security through its compliance of the Saudi king’s increasingly high 
financial demands. 
B. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: A NEW DOCTRINE AND A NEW KING 
While Graebner argues that Wilson’s presidency marked the beginning of a shift 
from an analytical to an ideological approach in overall U.S. foreign policy, it was during 
Truman’s presidency that ideology began to play a substantial role in U.S.-Saudi relations 
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specifically. Additionally, the incorporation of Middle Eastern states that shared the 
United States’ opposition of communism into its security strategy during this period does 
not mean that the United States completely shed its analytical approach, but it does imply 
that Washington included new calculations into its foreign strategy. Saudi Arabia was not 
a democracy, although this did not preclude the United States from continuing to 
cooperate with the kingdom. With the rise of Soviet Russia as the leading security threat 
to the United States following World War II, Saudi Arabia’s oil and geographic location 
continued to fit into Washington’s analytical security strategy. However, implementation 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine lessened the distinction between the ideological and 
analytical approaches used by the United States in its foreign policy with Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia’s oil and geographic location continued to remain important to the United 
States in its security strategy against the Soviet Union, but the United States’ attempts to 
exert its anticommunist agenda into regional politics blurred the lines of where the 
security interests of the United States ended and its ideological interests began.  
In addition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, a change in Saudi leadership contributed 
greatly to the ongoing development of U.S.-Saudi security relations during the 
Eisenhower years. The death of Ibn Saud marked the end of a period of over two decades 
continuity in Saudi leadership. The late king’s son and successor, Saud bin Abdulaziz Al 
Saud, or King Saud, was often regarded by both the Saudi court and the U.S. government 
as unpredictable in his approach toward Middle Eastern states as well as Great Britain 
and the United States. The king’s erratic political behavior frustrated U.S. officials who 
hoped to find a dependable and loyal Middle Eastern partner against the spread of 
communism in the Middle East. Both the Eisenhower Doctrine and the succession of 
King Saud contributed greatly to the course of U.S.-Saudi security relations during the 
Eisenhower years, and this section will examine and analyze how those factors affected 
the relationship.  
1. The Eisenhower Doctrine 
In 1953, Ibn Saud died, and Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office as the 34th 
President of the United States. Under the Eisenhower administration, the United States 
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adopted one of its most pivotal foreign policies of the twentieth century: the Eisenhower 
Doctrine of 1957. While the Truman Doctrine encompassed many of the same principles 
as the Eisenhower Doctrine—namely the preservation of democracy—the United States 
applied the Eisenhower Doctrine much more aggressively in its relationship with Saudi 
Arabia by vowing to “use military force to stop the spread of communism in the Middle 
East.”140 The doctrine resulted not only from fears of Soviet expansion but also from a 
desire to “counter Egypt’s growing influence,”141 and implementation of the doctrine in 
the region extended beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia, guiding U.S. action in Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon.142 The Middle East was, in other words, central to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Washington’s commitment to prevent the spread of communism in the region 
caused the U.S. government to indirectly take on the burdens of Middle Eastern stability, 
which the United States would carry into the late twentieth century and beyond.   
The emphasis that the Eisenhower Doctrine placed on Middle Eastern politics 
drove Washington to carry forward the ideological approach that Truman had introduced 
through the Truman Doctrine, which indirectly affected the United States’ relationship 
with Saudi Arabia. Most Middle Eastern states reacted negatively to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine.143 Since accepting the doctrine meant challenging the authority of Nasser, who 
was highly popular throughout the Middle East at the time, it requested leaders in the 
region take a huge political risk.144 Under the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, Washington looked to Saudi Arabia for support in implementing the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in the Middle East. Dulles believed Saudi Arabia’s new king, King Saud, was 
“the only figure in the area with sufficient presence and potential assets to serve as a 
counterpoise to Nasser.”145 The king accepted this new ideological doctrine proposed by 
the United States, which strengthened U.S.-Saudi security relations, but this action by no 
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means implied that relations between Washington and the new king would be easy from 
this point on.   
Saudi Arabian domestic politics during the reign of King Saud and internal 
politics within the House of Saud prevented the Eisenhower Doctrine from being 
effectively implemented through Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. A failed attempt to 
assassinate United Arab Republic (UAR) President Nasser, irresponsible spending of the 
royal purse and other erratic behavior caused many within the Saudi court to doubt King 
Saud’s leadership abilities.146 Popularity for King Saud’s younger brother, Crown Prince 
Faisal gained momentum after the failed assassination attempt of Nasser, and, in 1958, 
with the help of the Saudi court, Faisal wrested many of the king’s responsibilities away 
from King Saud and held them until 1960.147 Observing the internal strife within the 
Saudi court caused the Eisenhower administration to second guess its decision to look to 
King Saud as a source of influence with the Arab world. 
In 1958, three things occurred that helped influence Eisenhower to change his 
approach toward the Middle East: the Lebanon crisis, the Iraqi revolution and the 
founding of the U.A.R.148 These three events drove Eisenhower to acknowledge the 
greater role that Arab nationalism had come to play in Middle Eastern politics by the late 
1950s. Furthermore, these events, compounded with the political divide that plagued the 
House of Saud at the time, caused President Eisenhower to take his eyes off King Saud 
and look for another leader who Washington could use as the fulcrum through which to 
influence Middle Eastern politics: U.A.R. President Nasser.149 Fawaz A. Gerges writes 
that this sudden shift within the Eisenhower administration demonstrated that “the United 
States was not only to come to terms with [Nasser’s] brand of Arab nationalism, but also 
to use it as a political weapon against Soviet communism.”150 Following this shift in 
foreign policy, preexisting tensions between Washington and the U.A.R. began to thaw, 
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which Gerges argues occurred for three reasons: “first, preventing the further expansion 
of Soviet influence; second, protecting the huge oil reserves in the Arabian Peninsula and 
security the flow of cheap oil to the West; and third, keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
the ‘icebox.’”151 Gerges’ three reasons for why Eisenhower began to accept Arab 
nationalism and seek cooperation with Nasser suggests that Eisenhower’s ideological 
approach to foreign policy as implemented through the Eisenhower Doctrine still 
possessed a largely analytical aspect. While Gerges’ first point relates to the spread of 
communism, the scholar argues that Eisenhower was concerned about more than just 
preventing the spread of communism in the Middle East. President Eisenhower had very 
real security goals in the region, including the preservation of U.S. access to Middle 
Eastern oil fields, which depended upon regional stability.  
2. A New King 
King Saud adopted the traditional economic policies of that region, which allowed 
the royal family to claim ownership over all state revenues.152 King Saud’s dated 
economic policies resulted in a significant disparity between the wealth of the royal 
family and the financial status of rural farmers, and by the mid-1950s Saudi Arabia had 
developed into a mostly “two-class society.”153 Although Ibn Saud had helped modernize 
Saudi Arabia by bringing new technology and foreign trade to the country, many of these 
advancements—including projects to build schools, railroads and hospitals that 
ARAMCO was constructing at his bidding—stalled upon King Saud’s succession. Other 
than the railway that ARAMCO had built, which had helped transform Riyadh into a 
modern city, Ibn Saud developed little new infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Under King 
Saud, the kingdom continued to increase its oil production, exports and returns, but it was 
mostly the royal family who benefited from these profits while the rest of the country 
remained largely impoverished, minus a small middle class population in the urban 
areas.154 
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King Saud spent much of his reign engaged in political competition with his 
brother, Crown Prince Faisal, and many, including both the U.S. government and the 
Saudi court regarded the new king as an incompetent and immature ruler. Much of the 
Saudi court criticized the king for his lavish spending of government funds as well as his 
blatant cruelty toward his subjects. For instance, when riding in his car, he was known to 
throw money out of his window “to watch locals chase after it.”155 In 1958, after a Syrian 
intelligence chief accused King Saud of hiring him to assassinate the newly formed 
United Arab Republic (UAR) President Nasser, Crown Prince Faisal, backed by the 
Saudi court, confronted the Saudi king and forced him to transfer his power to the crown 
prince.156 After this event, Faisal managed most of the king’s political responsibilities 
while King Saud simply retained his status as figurehead until 1960, when Faisal turned 
his power back over to King Saud following a budget dispute.157 Washington considered 
Faisal to be a responsible and intelligent leader who tended to place the interests of the 
Saudi people in high regard; in short, he was everything that his brother was not. In 
addition to Faisal’s character and sense of responsibility, Washington’s belief that Faisal 
was “anti-communist” solidified Faisal’s position as the U.S. government’s first choice 
for Saudi king.158 In the years surrounding the Eisenhower administration, King Saud’s 
overall approach to foreign policy was as unpredictable as his domestic behavior was 
puerile. The following section will explore King Saud’s foreign policy in the Middle East 
and with both the British and the United States.  
a. King Saud and the Middle East 
King Saud’s approach to regional politics contrasted sharply with that of his 
father. While Ibn Saud interacted regularly with the British and U.S. governments both 
on an economic and political level, he tended to avoid involvement in regional affairs.159 
King Saud took a much more active role in Middle Eastern politics, however, and many 
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of his decisions during the 1950s were largely influenced by the Arab nationalist 
movement the swept the region in the mid-twentieth century.160 Many of the new king’s 
regional political actions during the 1950s reflected the anti-Western attitudes of the Arab 
nationalists, although a large portion of King Saud’s hostility seemed to be aimed at the 
European powers particularly, rather than at the United States. For instance, the Saudi 
king stood with Egypt and Syria in opposition to the Baghdad Pact, halted oil shipments 
to France and Great Britain and backed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s actions 
during the Suez Crisis.161 Desiring to gain popular support within the Arab world, King 
Saud complied with the Arab nationalists in his regional politics, which involved taking 
active measures against the British, who had financed his father’s kingdom for decades. 
King Saud’s approach toward regional politics was also disjointed, however. Even 
though King Saud cooperated with Egypt and Syria to oppose the Baghdad Pact, he also 
viewed them as threats to his power; Syria was growing closer to the Soviet Union, and 
he was engaged in competition with Nasser over the title of leader of the Arab world.162 
In many ways, King Saud retained the mentality of a tribal leader while failing to 
understand the greater geopolitical context of the Cold War during which he reigned. 
Instead of engaging in regional political competition and schemes, such as assassination 
attempts, to become the next Arab chieftain, King Saud could have invested more time 
and effort into building a stronger relationship with the West to ensure Saudi Arabia’s 
protection from the growing Soviet threat. 
b. King Saud and the British 
Ibn Saud’s distrust of the British left a strong impression on his son, and King 
Saud interpreted the Baghdad Pact as nothing more than another attempt by the old 
imperial power to reinvigorate its colonialist policies within the Middle East. Signed by 
Turkey, Iraq and the British in 1955, the three countries intended the pact to result in “a 
joint defense against external aggression” in the Middle East and to “establish [British] 
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cooperation … not just consultation.”163 Whether some members of the British 
government truly had any imperialist intentions in mind, most British supporters of the 
pact wished that it would at least result in stronger British and NATO influences in the 
Middle East. In a speech to the House of Commons on March 2, 1955, British Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden stated that he hoped the agreement would “forge a new 
association with Iraq, which will bring our relations into line with those which already 
exist with Turkey and our other partners in NATO.”164  
Like his father, King Saud tended to trust the Americans more than the British. In 
the context of a period of intense Arab nationalist movements, much of the Arab world 
viewed the Baghdad Pact between Great Britain and the two Middle Eastern nations as 
nothing more than European colonialism cloaked in military diplomacy.165 Many 
scholars argue that the Baghdad Pact was nothing more than part of Great Britain’s 
Soviet containment strategy. British historian Richard L. Jasse points out that the 
Baghdad Pact fit into British “determination to maintain strategic paramountcy in an area 
considered vital for the defense of the empire” and that the “‘Northern Tier’ of states . . . 
was certainly interwoven throughout the discussions of the time.”166 Regardless, King 
Saud continued to view Great Britain with suspicion, making the United States his most 
viable option when considering support from a great power.  
c. King Saud and the United States 
Regardless of the British government’s true intentions in the Baghdad Pact, a 
similar argument could be made about U.S. interests in the Middle East in the 
Eisenhower Doctrine—that the doctrine represented an attempt by the United States to 
exert its political authority beyond its own borders. Many historians agree that the 
primary purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to “use economic aid, military aid, and 
armed forces to stop the spread of communism in the [Middle East],” which resulted 
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from the United States’ “alarm [of] Soviet capabilities to expand into the Third 
World.”167 Since much of the Eisenhower Doctrine focused on regions in the Eastern 
Hemisphere, many have argued that, as the Cold War progressed, the United States’ 
adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine to combat communism was really a disguised 
attempt of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East, East Asia and other regions of the world. 
Some Middle Eastern countries such as Syria viewed America’s policy of Soviet 
containment the same way King Saud had viewed the Baghdad Pact—as nothing more 
than continued attempts by the British to exert their control over the Middle East.168 In 
1955, the Ba’ath Party blamed the assassination of a highly popular and pro-Ba’athist 
colonel by a Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) member on Western infiltration of 
the Middle East and subsequently conducted a “witch hunt” of all SSNP members and 
pro-Westerners within the country.169 The assassination, in addition to the Suez Crisis 
and Syria’s discovery of a 1956 British-Iraqi scheme to overthrow the Syrian 
government, resulted in an overwhelmingly anti-Western attitude among the Syrians by 
the time the United States pronounced the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.170 In August 
1957, the U.S. government denounced the Syrian ambassador in Washington and his 
assistant following the expulsion of three U.S. diplomats from Syria after the Syrian 
government claimed to have discovered an American plot to overthrow it.171 Syria is 
only one of example of the growing hostility toward Western involvement in the Middle 
East, and King Saud shared some of the same sentiments as many of his Arab brethren. 
King Saud’s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, but his rejection of the 
Baghdad Pact, demonstrated the King’s willingness to trust American intentions in his 
foreign policy, and it highlighted the continued strengthening of U.S.-Saudi Arabian 
relations in the 1950s. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s response to the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
compared to other Middle Eastern countries, emphasized the strong level of trust between 
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Riyadh and Washington. King Saud remained much more receptive toward U.S. 
interaction in the Middle East during the 1950s while other countries in the region such 
as Egypt grew increasingly apprehensive of the United States’ intentions.172 
While King Saud’s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine allowed the United 
States to continue to project its power from the Middle East toward Soviet Russia, 
Eisenhower experienced a great deal more frustration in his diplomatic efforts with Saudi 
Arabia than his predecessors. Lacking the same political aptitude as his father, King Saud 
possessed an overly simplistic view of the U.S.-Saudi political relationship, viewing the 
United States mostly as a weapons supplier, financier and a primary oil customer.173 
Additionally, the rise in Arab nationalism, the decline of British and French influence in 
the Middle East and Congress’s resentment of King Saud’s economic policies forced the 
American president to work tirelessly at maintaining a strong rapport with the Saudi 
King.174 The power struggle between King Saud and his brother Prince Faisal often 
prevented Washington from making political, military and economic advancements with 
the Saudis at the same rapid pace that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman maintained. King 
Saud’s compliance with the Eisenhower Doctrine remains a significant cornerstone in the 
development of U.S.-Saudi relations today. Notwithstanding this success, King Saud’s 
other aforementioned leadership failures created an unreliable partner for the United 
States and contributed to rising tensions in the region, causing Eisenhower to turn over to 
President John F. Kennedy “a Middle East mess.”175 
C. PRESIDENT KENNEDY: A NEW APPROACH WITH OLD RESULTS 
President John F. Kennedy sought to rebalance Washington’s approach toward 
the Middle East to show less favoritism to the Saudi kingdom. Both his desire to 
emphasize Third World development and a lack of faith in King Saud’s ability effectively 
lead the Arab world drove Kennedy’s new diplomatic approach. The Kennedy 
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administration embraced and carried forward Eisenhower’s approach toward Arab 
nationalism and Nasser. Kennedy believed that the key to affecting Middle Eastern 
regional politics was by developing a relationship with Egyptian President Nasser, who 
Washington believed could influence the Arab nationalists to resist communism. 
Additionally, historical evidence suggests that Kennedy disliked the Saudi king 
personally and believed him ill-fit to lead the Arab world, and this personality conflict 
also contributed to the damaging of the relationship. By loosening some of the diplomatic 
bonds that Kennedy’s predecessors had developed with the House of Saud and by 
obtaining Nasser’s favor, the Kennedy administration believed that it could bring stability 
to the Middle East. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy’s foreign policy was largely ideological 
because it sought to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East by both 
developing Third World countries and utilizing the influence that Nasser held on Arab 
nationalists. Yet, also like Eisenhower, Kennedy’s approach still had analytical elements 
because it sought to protect U.S. oil and geostrategic interests in the Middle East.   
King Saud also tried to distance Saudi Arabia from the United States to appease 
growing dissent among Arab nationalists who criticized the House of Saud for being too 
submissive to the demands of the West. Although King Saud seemed to recognize the 
immense contribution that the United States brought to both the security of the crown and 
his kingdom, he eventually gave in to many of the demands of the Arab nationalists due 
to overwhelming domestic political pressure. Much of the Arab nationalists’ criticism 
centered on the U.S. military presence at Dhahran airfield, which would remain a point of 
contention throughout the Kennedy years. When the Yemeni Civil War broke out in 
1962, it quickly developed into an Arab proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
When King Saud requested assistance from the United States, President Kennedy 
responded by sending support to Dhahran Airfield, which the United States had handed 
over to the Saudi government one year prior. The following sections will examine in 
detail the major issues that affected the security relationship during the Kennedy years: 
tension driven by domestic politics, regional politics and personality conflicts; U.S. 
military presence at Dhahran Airfield; and Operation Hardsurface, which was Kennedy’s 
response to the Yemeni Civil War. 
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1. Tension and Friction 
King Saud’s unpredictable foreign policy caused Washington to doubt his 
effectiveness in regional politics, but the king demonstrated true leadership skills within 
the Arab League during the Kuwaiti crisis of 1961, when Iraq sought to annex the new 
Kuwaiti state. King Saud staunchly opposed the aggressive claims on Kuwait by the Iraqi 
leader, Abd al-Karim Qassem, from the beginning of the conflict. The Saudi king told the 
Kuwaiti government that “as far as we are concerned, we are with you in the fight and 
struggle.”176 King Saud believed Kuwait’s national security to be directly linked to Saudi 
Arabia’s, emphasizing this position in a radio broadcast: “any mishap that befalls Kuwait 
affects Saudi Arabia and vice versa.”177 King Saud often led the debates among the Arab 
leaders in the Arab League Council, attempting to bring others to his side in support of 
Kuwait against potential Iraqi aggression.178 Finally, the Saudi government backed its 
words with action, providing 1,200 troops to replace British forces—a number matched 
only by the UAR—after Great Britain withdrew as a result of the British military 
drawdown in the Middle East.179 
King Saud’s support for Kuwait roused suspicion in the White House, causing 
President Kennedy to question the king’s true motives. In a meeting with several of his 
ambassadors, the president asked Parker T. Hart, ambassador designate to Saudi Arabia, 
if the rumor about the Saudi troop movement was true and whether or not the ambassador 
thought that Saudi Arabia’s intentions were merely to defend Kuwait or to beat Iraq to an 
invasion. Hart responded that the answer to the President’s first question was true, and 
the ambassador also stated that he believed Saudi Arabia’s motives in the Kuwaiti crisis 
were strictly to defend the sovereignty of Kuwait and not to supplant any other authority 
that might pose a threat to Kuwait or its government. With respect to other potential Arab 
leadership, Hart mentioned that the U.A.R. had “come out flatfooted,” while the 
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ambassador remained uncertain of the positions of the U.S.S.R. and Iran.180  Ambassador 
Hart went on to proclaim that, with the gradual disentanglement of the British from the 
region, the United States should be prepared to see the emergence of a new power in the 
region, although he did not specify which one.181  
Throughout this exchange, Hart seemed eager to convince the president that King 
Saud has been exhibiting exceptional leadership skills in the crisis. The Saudi 
government’s leadership throughout the Kuwaiti crisis did little to impress much of 
Washington, however, and the Kennedy administration continued to invest a great deal of 
effort in engaging other Middle Eastern officials whom it believed to possess more 
leadership potential than King Saud. One of these leaders was Nasser; a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published on June 27, 1961 stated that “militant nationalism 
will continue to be the most dynamic force in Arab political affairs, and Nasser is very 
likely to remain its foremost leader and symbol for the foreseeable future.”182 
Additionally, the U.S. government placed a heavy focus on the political stability of Iran 
during this time. In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara dated 
June 28, 1961, the JCS stated how the “strategic importance of Iran” could not be 
overemphasized, but they added that the United States lacked sufficient military 
resources to defend Iran from the potential Soviet threat.183 Moreover, tension between 
the new Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Ali Amini and the Shah of Iran, the Palestinian 
refugee crisis, and Israel’s rapid movement toward the possession of a nuclear weapon 
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served as the leading topics for the bulk of meetings and correspondence in Washington 
during 1961; U.S.-Saudi relations often received much less attention.184 
Despite the long-standing economic partnership and existing security agreements 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Washington held reservations over 
entrusting the Saudi government to fill the expanding power vacuum created by reduced 
British presence in the region. U.S. State Department documents reveal that the Kennedy 
administration believed the internal political competition between King Saud and his 
brother, Crown Prince Faisal, affected the King’s ability to make sound decisions.185 
Additionally, disagreements over the existence of Israel as a Jewish state proved to be as 
divisive between the United States and Saudi Arabia as opposition of Soviet communism 
in the Middle East was uniting. King Saud’s frank and open criticism of the United 
States’ support for the “third state” irritated President Kennedy.186 In one letter addressed 
to several Arab leaders, the President criticized King Saud’s language from a previous 
piece of correspondence regarding the Palestinian conflict as “undiplomatic” and 
“insulting,” and he stated that the “only redeeming feature” was when the king agreed 
that the Palestinian Conciliation Commission (PCC) should have the “final chance” to 
deal with refugee crisis.187 Finally, the June 27 NIE revealed that the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) had little faith in the military might of Saudi Arabia, regardless of the 
training and support that the United States had provided for the kingdom for the near past 
decade. The document regarded the U.A.R. as the only true military threat to Israel, 
which gave “Nasser a unique claim to Arab leadership.”188 Nonetheless, at this time, 
Washington regarded Israel as the strongest military force in the Middle East, despite 
whatever benefits Nasser’s leadership brought the U.A.R., and the administration lumped 
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Iraq and Yemen into the same group as Saudi Arabia, believing these countries to be 
“incapable of bringing effective military force against Israel.”189 
In the same meeting that Ambassador Hart praised King Saud for his strong 
leadership within the Arab League during the Kuwaiti crisis, he also advocated that the 
United States take full advantage of the strong connection that it shared with the Saudi 
military through the USMTM. He believed that the “regime in Saudi Arabia must surely 
change and new leadership [was] most likely to come from this element.”190 Kennedy 
agreed, replying, “it was indeed very important to maintain our relationship with the 
[Saudi] military.”191 The ongoing rivalry between King Saud and his brother Prince 
Faisal concerned Kennedy, but this exchange between the President and Ambassador 
Hart also reveals that Washington underestimated the strength and resiliency of the 
House of Saud since the federal government had expected the royal family to fall to the 
wave of modernism and nationalism that was sweeping much of the rest of the Middle 
East at that time. 
2. Dhahran Airfield 
The meeting between Ambassador Hart and President Kennedy had taken place 
within the context of a debate over the upcoming renewal of the U.S.-Saudi Dhahran 
Airfield agreement. Arab nationalists had begun to use the U.S. military’s presence at the 
airfield as support for their argument that the United States had imperialist intentions in 
Saudi Arabia.192 Despite the hold that Arab nationalism was gaining over the Saudi 
populace, the Saudi monarchy continued to favor the U.S. military presence at Dhahran; 
Riyadh believed the USMTM to be particularly beneficial for Saudi security. King Saud 
could only keep the pressure of the Arab nationalists at bay for so long however, and 
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eventually he would succumb to many of their demands, including those over Dhahran 
Airfield. 
a. King Saud Bends to the Arab Nationalists 
King Saud had initially allowed the U.S. military to maintain a presence at 
Dhahran Airfield in exchange for military support and training—a condition agreed upon 
at the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) talks in 1951, which later became 
the USMTM.193 In March 1961, as the deadline approached to renew the Dhahran 
Airfield agreement, the king announced that he planned to terminate the airfield contract, 
but he simultaneously expressed a desire to maintain the USMTM provided that it cut the 
number of Americans down to 80 personnel and transfer them outside of Dhahran.194 The 
king’s announcement not to renew the agreement occurred on March 16 on Radio Mecca 
and came largely as a surprise to Washington since the two governments were still 
engaging in talks over the upcoming renewal at that time.195 Whether it was due to 
miscommunication or blatant disregard for diplomatic courtesy, Riyadh’s declaration was 
not only unexpected, but it occurred only a few hours after the American Embassy had 
conveyed to Washington that a joint statement regarding the future of the airfield would 
be made on March 18.196  
While the Department of State considered the Saudi king’s unilateral actions 
offensive, it also further revealed the “shaky” state of internal politics within the 
kingdom.197 Two days after the announcement, the Saudi Arabian ambassador reported 
in a message to the Under Secretary of Defense that the radio transmission had been 
made in haste to respond to Arab nationalists who were placing an increasing amount of 
pressure on the king. King Saud tried to defend his actions to the United States and not 
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only make his actions appear as nonconsequential but beneficial to the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship. The Saudi ambassador argued that the king desired to continue to pursue a 
strong partnership with the United States and that he believed that the unexpected 
proclamation could only strengthen the relationship between Washington and Riyadh.198  
In an attempt to soften the image of the United States as an imperialistic force in 
Saudi Arabia, Washington made public statements that Dhahran Airfield belonged to the 
Saudi government and avoided the use of the use of the term base when referring to 
Dhahran as much as possible.199 Additionally, the United States used Dhahran Airfield as 
a mostly Military Air Transport Service terminal, and, at the time of the announcement, it 
housed 1,332 personnel and only 10 transport aircraft. During this time, however, the JCS 
were exploring options to modify the airfield and add “additional facilities” that would 
allow the military to use it as a “post-strike field.”200 Up to this point, the United States 
used Dhahran mostly for military transport, although the Department of Defense was 
considering expanding its use for tactical purposes. 
In addition to the unpredictable nature of King Saud’s political behavior, his 
declining health also negatively impacted his ability to provide stable leadership to both 
his country and the Arab world in general. The king’s health continued to worsen 
throughout 1961 as details regarding the debate over Dhahran Airfield still hung in the 
balance, and in December he was admitted to a hospital in Boston, Massachusetts.201 In 
the meantime, Crown Prince Faisal stepped in to fill the role of king during Saud’s 
absence although the prince rejected the title of king, and, while he made note of many 
issues and decisions facing the crown, Faisal declined to make any official decisions 
regarding national policy during that time. King Saud’s health eventually returned, and, 
before he left the United States, he met with President Kennedy in West Palm Beach, 
Florida. The meeting between the two leaders seemed to sweep aside much of the 
previous malcontent and suspicion that had largely characterized their relationship up to 
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that point, and King Saud walked out of the meeting, according to Hart, in a “euphoric” 
state.202 Hart goes into little detail regarding King Saud’s experience at the U.S. hospital 
and the conversation that transpired during the meeting in Palm Beach, but the 
ambassador does make it clear that these two events marked a turning point in the 
relationship between the king and the president. 
b. A Diplomatic Breakthrough 
Capitalizing on the sudden upswing in relations between Riyadh and 
Washington—personalized hospital care and a “euphoric” meeting with the president—
Ambassador Hart reengaged King Saud in talks about the airfield agreement renewal 
shortly after the king’s return to Saudi Arabia. In a private interview on March 11, 1962, 
Hart asked King Saud if, following the deliverance of Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi 
government, the king would be willing to allow the United States to use the airfield for 
noncombatant aircraft only for “repairs, refueling and rest crews.”203 King Saud agreed 
to this proposition, and, when asked about the number of personnel that he would allow 
the United States to retain at the airfield, the king told the Ambassador that “the 
numerical strength of [the] mission should be whatever the U.S. government considered 
desirable.”204  
Hart’s diplomatic success brought relief to Washington, and, to demonstrate its 
gratefulness, the United States relocated its Navy communications unit from Dhahran to 
Bahrain without any previous request from the Saudi Arabian government. In accordance 
with the agreement, the Second Air Division withdrew, along with a plane assigned to 
Commander, Middle East Force, which had never been authorized by any agreement to 
be at Dhahran anyway. Hart notes that he and his colleagues also recommended to 
President Kennedy that the Chief of the USMTM be a position reserved for the rank of 
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Army general and that the Chief of the USMTM, Air Force section be a colonel—a 
suggestion to which both the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed.205  
c. The U.S.-Saudi Security Paradox 
Although most of the transfer of Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi government went 
relatively smoothly, Ambassador Hart describes several specific issues that caused 
concern within both governments, which are largely symbolic of the paradoxical nature 
of the broader U.S.-Saudi security relationship at that time. First, the Saudi government 
had no experience running an airfield, and Hart remained particularly concerned about 
government’s ability to manage the facility financially. Second, recent regional political 
tensions had caused Saudi Arabia to dismiss many of its Egyptian teachers, leading to 
potential conflict between Saudi Arabia and a country that the Kennedy administration 
was pursuing for rapprochement. Third, despite any previous anxieties that Riyadh had 
expressed over a U.S. military presence at Dhahran Airfield, the Saudi government 
suddenly seemed alarmed about the “unhesitating readiness” that the U.S. demonstrated 
concerning the departure of the Second Air Division, believing the United States to be 
“the only strong and disinterested friend of the Kingdom.”206 On one hand, like Dhahran 
Airfield, the United States valued the economic and strategic advantage that Saudi Arabia 
brought to the table, but Washington doubted the Saudi kingdom’s competency in basic 
defense matters and its capacity to be an effective stabilizing political force in the region. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia feared that the United States was becoming another 
imperialist force that would only continue to undermine the potential of the Arab world, 
yet the Saudi government’s anxiety over the easy and rapid departure of the U.S. military 
from Dhahran suggests that the royal family recognized its dependence on U.S. support. 
3. Operation Hardsurface  
The historian Ethan Nadelmann writes that Kennedy’s approach toward foreign 
diplomacy largely excluded Eisenhower’s “rigid bipolarity” and that the president 
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pursued a more open policy with many non-aligned states while encouraging the 
development of Third World countries.207 Additionally, he argues that the Kennedy 
administration deliberately placed Middle Eastern affairs low on its list of foreign policy 
priorities because Washington was “already crowded by far more pressing problems.”208 
Washington tried to maintain this distant, hands-off approach toward the Middle East 
during the Yemeni Civil War of 1962–1967, but the effect that the crisis had on the 
stability of the region forced Kennedy’s hand into taking action. Nadelmann writes,  
 
if the Jordanian and, especially, the Saudi Monarchs had not involved 
themselves with the civil war, American interests would have been limited 
to ensuring free passage through the Bab el-Mandeb straits and 
maintaining the adjacent British position in Aden and the South Arabian 
Federation. However, the decision of the monarchs to come to al-Badr’s 
assistance created the danger of instability in both fragile monarchies, with 
the concomitant threat to the oil flow and Arab-Israeli “peace.”209  
 
Had the Yemeni Civil War remained internal to the borders of Yemen, both 
Kennedy and King Saud would have met their foreign policy objectives of creating and 
maintaining their distance from one another. 
In many ways, the Yemeni Civil War served as an Arab proxy war between Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia that ultimately led to the intervention of the Great Powers. By and 
large, Nasser’s wounded pride over the recent break-up of the U.A.R. drove him to take a 
vested interest in the Yemeni conflict since he saw it as an opportunity to redeem himself 
as a strong and powerful Arab leader. Arguably, King Saud, who remained locked in 
competition with Nasser to be the leader of the Arab world, introduced Saudi Arabia to 
the Yemini Civil War so as not to be outdone by the Egyptian president. Some historians 
disagree; Fawaz A. Gerges contends that Saudi Arabia would have involved itself in the 
conflict regardless of Nasser’s actions, arguing that a successful coup against the Yemini 
Imamate would pose a direct security threat to Saudi Arabia, especially if it were to be 
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replaced with an “Egyptian-style revolutionary regime.”210 Regardless, the upheaval 
combined with the movement of Egyptian troops into Yemen terrified the Saudi crown, 
resulting in a cry for help from Riyadh to Washington.211  
a. Playing Favorites 
President Kennedy tried to keep the United States out of the Yemini conflict as 
long as possible. In a meeting in Washington on October 5, 1962, Crown Prince Faisal 
asked for assistance from the president in collecting information on Nasser while 
preventing the Egyptian leader from taking aggressive political or military action in 
Yemen. Kennedy, who had recently authorized aid for the U.A.R. in the Yemeni conflict, 
replied with a generic political response. The president stated that the United States felt 
sympathy for Saudi Arabia’s pursuit toward regional peace and stability, but he believed 
that the Saudi king put too much faith in the ability of the United States to influence the 
goals and decisions of other foreign leaders. The president did promise the Crown Prince 
that the U.S. government would soon make available for purchase multiple supersonic jet 
fighters (F-5A’s) about which the Saudi government had previously inquired. Kennedy 
also attempted to initiate a conversation about the USMTM, but Faisal responded that he 
would leave such a conversation to the United States Embassy in Jeddah and the Saudi 
Minister of Defense.212  
President Kennedy’s attempts to avoid U.S. military involvement in support of 
Saudi Arabia were short lived, however. The president even endeavored to employ an 
“economic development” approach in which the United States gave $431.8 million of 
food aid to Egypt during the years from 1963 through 1965—a move that Washington 
hoped would help bring internal stability to the country.213 Both the Saudi and Jordanian 
kings saw Kennedy’s increased support of Nasser as an attempt by the U.S. federal 
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government to use Egypt as the United States’ new “instrument of influence” in the 
region.214 King Saud refused to accept what he perceived to be an underhanded move by 
Washington, and he responded in kind by reaching out to the House of Saud’s once 
primary financial and military supporter—Great Britain—for help.215  
On September 26, 1962 the Yemeni Imamate fell. The new republican regime 
established itself as the new Yemini government under Brigadier General Abd Allah al-
Sallal, and the role that Egypt played in making the revolution possible was apparent in 
Washington.216 The Soviet Union also took a position in the conflict and recognized the 
new republican Yemeni regime in October 1962, which the Kennedy administration 
largely saw itself as having no choice but to follow suit in doing in December of that 
year.217 In an attempt to maintain the support of Saudi Arabia and Jordan following its 
recognition of the new Yemeni regime, the Kennedy administration promised the kings 
of both countries that the United States had “intentions to stand by [the kingdoms of 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan] and to circumscribe Nasser’s influences in the Arabian 
Peninsula.”218 Kennedy had hoped that this balanced, diplomatic approach to supporting 
all sides in the conflict (with the exception of the recently toppled Yemeni Imamate) 
would return stability to the region. Instead, Nasser misinterpreted the recognition of the 
new Yemeni government by the United States and Russia as support for Egypt’s 
continued assistance for the Yemeni rebels, who Riyadh viewed to be a direct threat to its 
Saudi security.219  
Washington’s recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) came on the heels 
of a letter that had gone out to U.S. embassies in the Eastern Hemisphere. The letter 
revealed that the United States planned to recognize the Y.A.R. because Washington 
believed that this action would put an end to the Arab proxy war. The letter told the 
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embassies to communicate to their host governments that “following on U.S. approaches 
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Y.A.R., which were designed to obtain eventual 
disengagement in the Yemen, U.S. recognition of the Y.A.R. in the near future was 
likely.”220 Any attempts toward appeasing the Middle Eastern governments by the 
Kennedy administration failed miserably, however, and, on January 7, 1963, Egypt, 
which had already been bombing many coastal villages in Saudi Arabia, began to conduct 
airstrikes against Najran.221 Thus, far, Kennedy’s approach toward the Yemeni conflict 
backfired because of the regional political context within which it occurred. His largely 
ideological approach, which sought to pacify the Middle East through the recognition of 
the so-called republic regime’s overthrow of an Imamate, fanned the flames of the 
ongoing rivalry between the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian rulers, which had by now 
become a military conflict.    
b. Kennedy Shifts His Approach 
Egypt’s violence against the Hejadi coast changed President Kennedy’s mind 
about his approach to the conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia; in January 1963, 
President Kennedy decided that it was time for military intervention.222 On June 13, 
1963, the JCS informed Commander in Chief, Strike Command and Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean that the President had 
approved the deployment of eight F-100D tactical fighter aircraft and one support 
transport aircraft to Saudi Arabia.223 Washington codenamed this movement Operation 
Hardsurface, which had a two-part mission statement. The first part directed the U.S. Air 
Force “to conduct training exercises and operations with Saudi Air Forces in cooperation 
with USMTM as part of our overall efforts through the years to improve Saudi forces and 
as evidence of continuing U.S. interest in the internal stability and security of Saudi 
                                                 
220 Hart, Saudi, 152. 
221 Ibid., 154. 
222 Ibid., 165. 
223 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961–1963, Document 270, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d270. 
 65 
Arabia.”224 The second part of the mission statement was “to provide a limited air 
defense capability to Saudi Arabia to deter U.A.R. air operations over Saudi Arabia 
should such air operations be resumed.”225 
Diplomatically, Operation Hardsurface was more than just a demonstration of 
renewed U.S. support for Saudi Arabia.226 The operation represented another attempt by 
Washington to stabilize the Middle East, and the Yemini Civil War was only one of 
several Middle East conflicts that the administration was juggling at this time. Militarily, 
Kennedy intended Operation Hardsurface to be a “symbolic deterrent” only and not 
representative of any true desire to engage in military conflict, and he dictated a strict set 
of rules of engagement under which all U.S. aircraft were prohibited to engage the enemy 
without direct approval from the president himself.227  
c. Drawdown and Fallout 
On December 24, 1963, nearly a month after Kennedy’s assassination, the JCS 
expressed concern to Secretary of Defense McNamara over the poor state of the aircraft 
and their inability to continue with their present mission.228 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor believed that the Saudi Arabian Air Force now 
possessed the capability to defend itself against Egyptian aggression, and he 
recommended the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Dhahran at a sooner date than the State 
Department’s previously proposed date of January 31, 1964. A concurrent UN mission to 
Saudi Arabia was scheduled to withdraw on January 4, and General Taylor argued that, 
with UN forces gone, the remaining American aircraft would be an inadequate force to 
provide continued deterrence against Egypt in support of Operation Hardsurface. The 
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general argued that any aggressive action committed by Egypt after the State 
Department’s proposed later date would force the U.S. Air Force “to respond militarily or 
risk loss of credibility of its military power, not only in the Middle East, but world-
wide.”229 Washington ultimately decided to go with the State Department’s 
recommendation because of a previous deal that it had struck with Crown Prince Faisal, 
which stated that if the United States kept its planes in Saudi Arabia until January 31 then 
Riyadh would remain out of the Yemeni Civil War for a specified time.230 A letter from 
Crown Prince Faisal to President Johnson dated January 17, 1964 reveals that U.S.-Saudi 
security relations maintained a mostly positive tone during the drawdown of Operation 
Hardsurface, possibly because the Crown Prince had taken over much of the 
correspondence for Riyadh with Washington at this point.231  
Operation Hardsurface proved detrimental for the Kennedy administration for 
two reasons. First, by giving into King Saud’s requests for military assistance without 
making reciprocal demands, Kennedy gave up a bargaining chip that he could have used 
to push his reform agenda in Saudi Arabia.232 Middle East scholar Rachel Bronson 
stresses that President Kennedy desired to convince the Saudi monarchy to reform and 
modernize Saudi Arabia because he believed that westernizing the kingdom would keep 
Saudi Arabia from falling into communism.233 Bronson writes that Operation 
Hardsurface “marked the end of Kennedy’s reform agenda”234 in Saudi Arabia, and, 
furthermore, once Kennedy agreed to send aid to the Kingdom, he lost any real influence 
over King Saud to modernize.235 For example, shortly after Kennedy’s initial 
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authorization of the operation, the Saudi government caught wind that the U.S. forces 
coming to Saudi Arabia’s aid would include Jewish personnel and objected strongly. 
Kennedy rejected Riyadh’s request to remove the Jewish men from the roster, arguing 
that such a demand “hurt the Saudi cause,” and although Jewish Americans did 
participate in the operation, Riyadh never retracted its request, changed its position or 
apologized.236 Kennedy failed to seize the opportunity presented by situation that would 
help him pursue his objective of reforming Saudi Arabia because he replied too hastily to 
King Saud’s plea for help. 
Second, Operation Hardsurface put Kennedy increasingly at odds with Nasser, 
who arguably had more at stake in the Yemeni conflict than Kennedy.237 While King 
Saud remained true to his promise to disengage from the conflict, Egyptian troops 
continued to frustrate the United States by occupying the Arabian Peninsula throughout 
Operation Hardsurface and as late as October 1963.238 Kennedy failed in his efforts 
toward diplomatic rapprochement and military deterrence with and against Egypt through 
Operation Hardsurface, and Washington ultimately resorted to denying aid to Egypt by 
amending the PL-480 bill to prevent any country from receiving aid from the United 
States that was actively “‘engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts’ against 
the United States or its allies.”239 
D. CONCLUSION 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the Truman, Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations was neither entirely ideological nor analytical. While the 
Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines possessed ideological objectives, particularly 
preventing the spread of communism, and while Kennedy’s convictions that the 
developing Third World countries and influencing Arab nationalists could do the same, 
all three presidents still incorporated an analytical approach into their policies. For 
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instance, the construction of Dhahran Airfield and Washington’s increased financial 
support of the theocratic kingdom through the 50/50 Agreement suggest that defending 
U.S. oil interests in Saudi Arabia was just as important as preventing the spread of 
communism to the Truman administration. Likewise, although President Eisenhower 
believed a strong relationship with Nasser was the key to avoiding the spread of 
communism in the Middle East, Eisenhower also believed that, through Nasser, he could 
ensure regional stability, which would in turn keep Middle Eastern oil cheap and 
accessible.  
As Kennedy sought to distance the United States from Saudi Arabia, so Ibn Saud 
also tried to create diplomatic space between the two countries during the early 1960s. 
Kennedy’s goal of limiting communism’s influence by developing Third World countries 
and by continuing Eisenhower’s efforts to build a relationship with Nasser caused his 
administration to decrease diplomatic involvement with Riyadh. Likewise, pressure from 
Arab nationalists drove King Saud to push for a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in 
his kingdom in places like Dhahran Airfield. Prior to the Yemeni conflict, Kennedy’s 
ideological foreign policy goals were loosening the bonds of the U.S.-Saudi partnership.  
Opposing interests, new approaches to foreign policy and personality conflicts between 
President Kennedy and King Saud created friction between the U.S. and Saudi 
governments, but Nasser’s aggression during the Yemeni Civil War drove the United 
States and Saudi Arabia to continue to cooperate, albeit reluctantly, during the early 
1960s. The recommitment of U.S. forces to Dhahran Airfield in Operation Hardsurface 
served as a culminating event for the early U.S.-Saudi security relationship. U.S. 
intervention in the Yemeni Civil War is significant because it epitomizes a reoccurring 
theme during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies in U.S.-Saudi relations. 
While Washington tried to take a largely ideological approach to foreign policy during 
this time, analytical security objectives, namely oil and geostrategic interests, ultimately 
trumped the United States’ ideological goals in the Middle East. Within this shifting 
framework, Kennedy had no choice but to forgo his efforts to create a U.S.-Egypt 
partnership and provide protection to Saudi Arabia.  
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V. U.S.–SAUDI SECURITY CHALLENGES OF TODAY 
The history of U.S.-Saudi security relations reveals that both countries have relied 
on each other consistently to meet their security objectives. Furthermore, past events 
demonstrate that  the United States’ interests in Saudi Arabia have included but extended 
beyond oil for over half of a century, contradicting the largely stereotype idea that the 
United States’ only interest in the Middle East lies in its petroleum reserves. Certainly, oil 
served as the main driver for interaction between the two states initially—CASOC’s push 
for Washington’s financial assistance and President Roosevelt’s Foreign Petroleum 
Policy played a major role in the early stages of the development of this relationship. 
Roosevelt’s extension of the Lend-Lease Act during World War II and subsequent 
developments in the early stages of the Cold War, culminating in Operation Hardsurface, 
demonstrate that a strong diplomatic relationship with Saudi Arabia can serve as a critical 
piece of the United States’ analytical security strategy. The geographic location of Saudi 
Arabia and the House of Saud’s influence in the Arab world offer the United States a 
great advantage in U.S. Middle Eastern foreign policy and military strategy. Additionally, 
Saudi oil is valuable for more reasons than just economic ones; the U.S. military and the 
militaries of its allies and its enemies all depend upon petroleum products to fuel their 
ships, aircraft and other weapon systems, making the vast Saudi reserves central to U.S. 
security interests.  
While parallels can be drawn between some of the major issues surrounding the 
U.S.-Saudi security relationship today and those discussed in the previous chapters, other 
themes are new. Furthermore, most of these themes directly affect the security interests 
of the United States and Saudi Arabia—human rights being the major exception. This 
section will discuss some of the major issues that are often included in the dialogue 
regarding the U.S.-Saudi security partnership of today: Iran, the resurgence in Russian 
aggression, radical Islam, Saudi Arabia’s economy and human rights.  
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A. IRAN 
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran originated well before the formation of 
their modern states. The separation of cultures, languages and political boundaries extend 
to the time of the Persian Empire, ancient Arabia and beyond. As Islam spread from the 
Arabian Peninsula, most living in the Iranian plateau soon converted to the religion. The 
Persians eventually even distinguished themselves from Arabs living on the peninsula in 
the practice of their shared religion; today, Saudi Arabia is largely a Sunni country, while 
over 90 percent of Iranians are practicing Shi’ites.240 Rulers from both countries have 
been competing for regional control and influence since ancient times. Today, the modern 
states of Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to remain at odds with one another for many 
reasons. This section will explore two major issues currently affecting the security of 
Saudi Arabia with respect to Iran: the potential of a nuclear Iran and economic 
competition. 
1. A Nuclear Iran 
The ongoing nuclear talks between the P5+1 states and Iran could lead to 
increased conflict in the Middle East while also driving a wedge between U.S.-Saudi 
relations. Should Iran ever obtain a nuclear weapon, the result would likely energize 
existing sentiments of the centuries-old Sunni-Shi’a power struggle in the region. Naval 
Postgraduate School professor S. Paul Kapur points to the Indian-Pakistani conflicts of 
the late 1990s as one example of how nuclear weapons can embolden states militarily, 
suggesting that a nuclear Iran might “adopt risky policies that have destabilizing effects 
similar to those in South Asia.”241 Additionally, some members of the Saudi government 
fear that the new manner in which Iran could politically assert itself as a regional nuclear 
power could encourage Saudi Arabia’s radical Shi’a population to increase their 
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belligerent behavior toward the state.242 If the relaxed nuclear regulations on Tehran 
were ever to lead to Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, it could exacerbate age-old tensions 
in the region, regardless of whether Iran actually employs the weapon. 
2. Economic Competition 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are both oil powerhouses, and the two countries are 
currently locked in economic competition to become the primary oil supplier of several 
major Asian countries. Saudi Arabia is winning for the moment; Iran currently struggles 
to meet its domestic economic solvency threshold of $90 per barrel, and Saudi Arabia’s 
proximity and vast oil fields would make it an easy target for a nuclear and emboldened 
Iran.243 Saudi Arabia, the only Middle Eastern country that produces more oil than Iran, 
is India’s largest oil provider—a position that Iran covets—and, until recently, Saudi 
Arabia was also China’s.244 Saudi Arabia’s intentions for its oil trade with China and 
India extend beyond economic ones; much like Washington did with Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh is also expanding its international security support base through its economic 
partnerships. Over the past ten years, Saudi Arabia and India have negotiated a series of 
oil-for-security agreements, including both the Delhi Declaration of 2006 and the Riyadh 
Declaration of 2010.245 These deals and others have resulted in “increased security 
cooperation, joint research and development initiatives, and reciprocal extradition 
policies” between the two countries and are largely a result of Saudi Arabia’s fears that 
Iran will soon become a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS).246 Previous Saudi Foreign 
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal argued to the Chinese government that a nuclear Iran 
would “foment instability” in the Middle East, and he and has asked China to stop its oil 
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trade with Iran altogether.247 The economic competition that exists between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran fits within the greater context of a political and military rivalry, which directly 
impacts the region’s security and stability. 
B. RESURGENCE OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN 
HEMISPHERE 
Russia today is not the fallen Soviet Union of the 1990s, nor is it the same type of 
threat that drove the United States and Saudi Arabia to cooperate during the 1950s and 
1960s. Today’s Russia is actively pursuing increased political, military and economic 
influence in the Arctic, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. What 
distinguishes the Russia of today from the Russia of Truman’s presidency is that it no 
longer cloaks its aggression in a desire to spread a certain ideology—communism—but it 
instead openly seeks economic growth and political influence through territorial 
expansion. While economics play some motivational role in Russia’s aggression, much of 
Russia’s foreign policy is driven simply by its competition with China and the United 
States to be the most influential power in the region.248 While it may not be immediately 
obvious, Russia’s recent spike in military, political and economic aggression affects the 
U.S.-Saudi security relationship. The following sections will examine how Moscow is 
currently using its political and economic influence, in addition to its nuclear technology, 
to change the shape of Middle Eastern and global politics, which has the potential to 
create a rift in U.S.-Saudi security relations. 
1. Economic Influence 
In May 2015, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s largest oil exporter—a 
position that Saudi Arabia had enjoyed since 2005. The change came largely as the result 
of a 25-year deal struck in October 2013 between the Russian oil company Rosneft and 
the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).249 Furthermore, not all of this oil 
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will come from Russia; the Former Soviet Union (FSU) state Kazakhstan is also 
supplying a fraction of this oil. Some estimate that the seven million tons of oil per year 
that the Kazakh oil company, KazMunaiGas (KMG), currently ships as a result of this 
agreement, called the Russian-Kazakh oil swap arrangement, is likely to grow to ten 
million tons per year before the arrangement expires in roughly a decade.250 
In 1994 the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev floated the idea of a Eurasian 
Union of States while speaking at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. Throughout 
the next two decades, the Kazakh government designed and developed several economic 
agreements with Russia and other FSU states that centered mostly on customs 
agreements. In January 2012, many of these treaties came into effect to create a “Single 
Economic Space” between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.251 In 2014, these three states 
signed a treaty, resulting in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which 
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia also joined later that year.252 The stated intent of the EAEU is 
to be an “international organization for regional economic integration” that “provides for 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, pursues coordinated, harmonized 
and single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements 
with the Union.”253 In effect, the recently created EAEU is an economic agreement 
between Russia and several Former Soviet Union (FSU) states, which increases Russia’s 
ability to re-exert its economic influence on Central Asia and the Caucasus.  
In many ways, the sanctions placed on Russia by the United States in response to 
the Ukraine crisis have strengthened the EAEU. These sanctions forced the international 
oil company ExxonMobil to withdraw support from Rosneft in projects in Siberia and the 
Arctic. Driven out of the these regions, Exxon now assists Kazakhstan in the 
development of one of its most logistically challenging oilfields, Kashagan, which is 
behind schedule by nearly a decade and has suffered a dramatic rise in development 
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costs.254 ExxonMobil’s efforts in Kazakhstan is helping the Central Asian country keep 
its commitment to Russia, which is, in turn, helping Russia keep its commitment to China 
as its new primary petroleum exporter.  
Russia’s cooperation with Kazakhstan to reach its economic goals with its new 
partner, China, and Russia’s general influence within the EAEU highlights one example 
of Russia’s new post-Soviet influence in the Eastern Hemisphere. Speculatively, Russia, 
leveraging not only its resources but also its regional political clout to boost its economy, 
could expand its influence to other parts of the Eastern Hemisphere as well. Saudi Arabia 
holds roughly 268 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, while Kazakhstan holds only 30 
billion barrels.255 Oil and natural gas drives the economy of Russia, and its recent 
cooperation with Kazakhstan reveals that Russia is now looking outside of its own 
borders to expand its production and profits.256 While existing pipelines and Central 
Asia’s history and geographic location make the FSU states in Central Asia the more 
likely partners of Russia today, future economic and security agreements between Russia 
and Saudi Arabia are not outside of the realm of possibility.  
2. Russia and a Nuclear Saudi Arabia 
In addition to being a major export, oil serves as Saudi Arabia’s leading domestic 
energy resource today.257 The country is pursuing new options however, which has the 
potential to significantly alter Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. According to the World 
Nuclear Association, Riyadh plans to spend over $80 billion over the next 20 years to 
build 16 nuclear reactors. The Saudi government aims to bring its first nuclear reactor 
online in 2022, and, by 2040, it projects that 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s power will 
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come from nuclear sources.258 In June 2015, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Russia 
signed a nuclear energy deal in St. Petersburg that was “the first in the history of Russia-
Saudi relations to create a legal framework for cooperation between the nations in the 
field of nuclear energy.”259 In regards to what this new agreement might do for Russia’s 
economic influence on Saudi Arabia, Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak has 
stated, “Russia doesn’t aim to replace existing partners in oil and gas cooperation, but 
rather wants to establish new ones.”260  
Saudi Arabia, a state that once cooperated with the United States to deter Russian 
aggression, now seems to be looking to Russia for assistance in its energy endeavors, but 
the recent agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia possibly revolves around more 
than energy. While in St. Petersburg for the nuclear energy talks in June, Saudi 
ambassador to Russia, Abdulrahman Al-Rassi, described Russia as playing an 
“important” role within the Middle East and stated that Moscow had the responsibility to 
“maintain stability and security in the world.”261 Al-Rassi’s words remain only words at 
this point, but the assistance that Russia is offering Saudi Arabia in its domestic energy 
development could cause the Saudi government to overlook many ideological challenges 
regarding cooperation with Russia—just as the United States and Saudi Arabia did during 
the Cold War. Should Riyadh apply a purely analytical approach to its relationship with 
Russia, a security partnership with its old enemy might be the missing ingredient to help 
Saudi Arabia’s achieve its new nuclear objectives, which Russia has promised to help 
deliver. 
3. Shifting Alignments 
The supposedly thawing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Russia coincides 
chronologically with the U.S.-Iran nuclear talks. In a meeting on May 17, 2015 with 
                                                 
258 “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” World Nuclear Association, accessed July 14, 2015, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Saudi-Arabia/. 
259 “Russia and Saudi Arabia Ink Nuclear Energy Deal, Exchange Invites,” Russia Today, accessed 
June 25, 2015, http://rt.com/news/268198-russia-saudi-nuclear-agreements/. 
260 Ibid.  
261 Ibid. 
 76 
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir at Riyadh Air Base, United States Secretary of 
State John Kerry stated that “throughout the P5+1 negotiating process, we’ve been 
constantly consulting with Saudi Arabia, and we will continue to do so.”262  Kerry insists 
that both Washington and Riyadh have engaged in talks about “ways in which the United 
States and Saudi Arabia can cooperate going forward” in the context of a nuclear Iran.263  
While Kerry’s assertion arguably represents statements made by a Saudi 
government that feels that it has no other choice but to accept the P5+1 talks with Iran as 
an inevitable reality, Riyadh’s true sentiments and its intent for future security 
cooperation with the United States and the West remains hypothetical for now. For 
instance, Saudi researcher Mansour al-Marzouki argues that the potential of a nuclear 
Iran is providing Saudi Arabia with the incentive to restore the Middle East to its pre-
2011 Arab Spring political situation, which he characterizes as a power struggle strictly 
between the two major forces of the region: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Al-Marzouki 
contends that the rise of the non-state actor and an additional “third camp”—Turkey, 
Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood—has caused Saudi Arabia to lose regional authority 
and has simultaneously resulted in an increase in Iran’s influence in the Middle East.264 
Al-Marzouki cites Saudi Arabia’s recent military action against the Houthi rebels in 
Yemen as a leading example of Riyadh’s attempt to curb non-state actors’ aggression in 
the region. The analyst contends that the House of Saud is attempting to “transform the 
political equation from a balance between the state and non-state actors into a balance 
between a government and an opposition,”265 thus restraining Iran’s ability to prosper 
from the disintegration of the state system in the Gulf and the Levant. 
Additionally, al-Marzouki suggests that Saudi Arabia would likely pursue new 
alliances, although he does not specify which countries those new partners might be. 
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United Arab Emirates researcher Nasser Ahmed Bin Ghaith argues that the loosening of 
nuclear sanctions against Iran will soon lead to the relaxing of economic sanctions on the 
country, potentially introducing approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil per day into 
Western markets.266 Bin Ghaith suggests that the resulting economic effect would lead to 
a global drop in oil prices, and, in this case, Saudi Arabia would be wise to terminate its 
security agreements with the West in favor strengthening its diplomatic and security ties 
with existing members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, in addition, to 
Pakistan and Turkey.267 
A strong, future Russo-Saudi security partnership as a result of the P5+1 nuclear 
talks with Iran is a somewhat speculative idea. However, the June 2015 talks in St. 
Petersburg highlight that economic and energy cooperation between the Russia and Saudi 
Arabia is not only a possibility, but it is becoming a reality. Chapter II emphasizes how 
the early Saudi kings, wary of imperialist intentions, would have vehemently opposed 
economic or security cooperation with Soviet Russia. Just as Saudi Arabia has sought to 
strengthen its security ties with its economic partner India through the Delhi Declaration 
of 2006 and the Riyadh Declaration of 2010, so might Saudi Arabia take the same 
approach toward Russia, should the United States and the other P5+1 countries continue 
to relax their policies on Iran. 
C. RADICAL ISLAMISM 
The effect that radical Islamism has had in Saudi Arabia is complex. Modern-day 
radical Islamist militancy has its roots largely in the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, a previous 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who strongly advocated against the rise of 
secularist, socialist and nationalist movements within the Muslim world in the Middle 
East during the 1950s and 1960s. Executed by the Egyptian government in 1966, Qutb’s 
book Milestones laid much of the groundwork for the basic ideology and strategies of 
present day Islamist militant groups. Qutb introduced six major themes that remain at the 
core doctrine of the majority of radical Islamist groups today: “jahiliyah (ignorance); 




tawhid (monotheism); hakimiyat Allah (God’s sovereignty); takfir (the right of faithful 
Muslims to declare other Muslims to be infidels); wala wal bara (loyalty and 
disassociation); and jihad and istishhad (striving and martyrdom in the path of God).”268  
Naval Postgraduate School professor Mohammed M. Hafez writes that modern 
radical militant Islamism is comprised of at least three major subgroups: Islamic 
nationalism, transnational Islamism and revolutionary Islamism.269 Islamic nationalism 
focuses much of its efforts on the expulsion and eradication of foreign occupiers—Hamas 
and its fight against Israel would fall into this category—while transnational Islamism 
seeks to wage a global war against kafirs, or nonbelievers, and ‘far enemies’ such as the 
West.270 While groups belonging to these two categories possibly pose at least some 
challenge to Saudi Arabian security, revolutionary Islamism has historically presented the 
greatest threat to the Saudi government because it “seeks to transform the existing 
political order in any given state or national government through mass mobilization or 
violent activism.”271 Historically, revolutionary Islamism has been the largest radical 
Islamist threat within Saudi Arabia. 
The autocratic nature of the Saudi government has made it particularly vulnerable 
to revolutionary Islamism. Islamist activism shares many characteristics of other social 
movements, including repertoires, organizational structures and collective identities, but 
the particular political environment of the Middle East in general often drives many 
Islamist groups to radicalize. By using “political exclusion and repression to maintain 
rule,” governments often force dissenting citizens to “organize through informal 
networks and build collective identities through these networks; and it is this character of 
the Islamist movement which makes it distinct from other social movements.”272 
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Authoritarian governments of the Middle East make participation in political activity 
much more difficult for the average citizen, and, therefore, oppressive regimes assist in 
solidifying the collective identity of opposition groups through shared experiences of 
repression. Many Middle Eastern states contribute to the radicalization of Islamist groups 
by taking away citizens’ ability to vote or protest, leading some to believe that the only 
vehicle through which they can communicate their platform is violence.273 
Saudi Arabia belongs in this category. The government of Saudi Arabia is a 
monarchy absent of political parties and bases its legal system on a strict Sunni 
interpretation of Sharia law.274 Furthermore, the theocratic nature of the Saudi 
government only complicates the political construct in which citizens can actively 
participate in political events. For example, while the 85–90 percent of the population 
that is Sunni might welcome a Sunni government that enforces a certain interpretation of 
Sharia law, the remaining citizens may find many of Riyadh’s policies particularly 
repressive, since the government restricts most forms of religious expression that fail to 
comply with authorized interpretations of Sunni Islam.275 The very structure of Saudi 
Arabia’s government makes the country particularly susceptible to radical Islamist 
movements. 
Activism driven by religious dissent among citizens with their government has 
existed within Saudi Arabia since at least the 1950s, if not earlier. The motivational 
source for activism in the 1950s originated outside the country however, as Egyptian 
President Nasser stirred the opposing sentiments of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’ite population, 
particularly within the security sector, resulting in multiple coup attempts. Decades later, 
in 1979, religious insurgents briefly took control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, 
propagating a message that the House of Saud was “corrupt, un-Islamic and far too 
permissive in allowing Western cultural influence to penetrate the Kingdom.”276 The 
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supposed Western-influenced Saudi government responded to the mosque takeover by 
executing all 63 of the survivors who participated in the terrorist event. In November 
1990, the Saudi government confiscated the passports of a group of women who 
participated in a peaceful protest for vehicle driving rights in Riyadh. In May 1993, the 
Saudi government arrested and interrogated a group of religious leaders from the 
Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), which supported many 
Western-themed ideas, such as universal human rights, and the government had them 
fired from their jobs. From November 1995 until 2004, a string of violent political attacks 
occurred in Saudi Arabia, which killed 35 people and injured 160, and most evidence 
strongly suggests that Saudi nationals carried out these attacks. The perpetrators often 
directed their assaults at U.S. and other foreign military personnel, including a car bomb 
that killed five Americans and two Indian nationals outside the workplaces of U.S. 
advisers to the Saudi Arabian National Guard in 1995 and a truck bomb planted near U.S. 
Air Force housing in al-Khobar that same year.277 
The rise of ISIS has compounded the traditional revolutionary Islamist threat in 
Saudi Arabia and added a transnational Islamist element. In November 2014, ISIS leader 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created an audio recording encouraging Muslims to stand up 
against the House of Saud, who he claims unlawfully controls the Islamic holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina. He encouraged the “sons of Al-Haramayn,” meaning sons of Mecca 
and Medina, to “draw your swords and divorce life, because there should be no security 
for the Saloul,” which is a pejorative description of the House of Saud.278 In this same 
recording, Baghdadi expressed plans to expand ISIS’s territory to include the states of 
Saud Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Algeria and Egypt.279 The leader urged Saudi dissenters of 
their government to execute “lone wolf” attacks and “light the earth with fire against all 
dictators.”280 Baghdadi’s attempt to use Saudi nationals reveals that one of his major 
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strategies is to build upon the revolutionary Islamist sentiments that already exist in 
Saudi Arabia to carry out his transnational Islamist campaign.  
Radical Islamism is not just a threat to the United States and the West. The 
movement affects many Middle Eastern governments, including the Saudi regime. 
Moreover, both countries share the same transnational Islamist threats such as ISIS, 
which seek to destroy the peace and government structures of both states. Through 
security cooperation, Saudi Arabia and the United States can help each other protect 
against and diminish the threat that radical Islamism holds for both countries. 
D. THE PETROLEUM-BASED ECONOMY 
In recent years, the Saudi government, under the late King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, or King Abdullah, tried to confront political opposition by adjusting 
policies that directly affected jobs and the local economy. During the Arab revolts of 
2011, the Saudi government increased pay for the entire public sector by 15 percent—an 
action that had many critics accusing the government of providing “handouts” to “buy off 
economic dissent.”281 Whether these accusations hold any validity, Riyadh’s approach 
toward its domestic economy suggests that the government truly believes that political 
dissent cannot be curbed by adjusting its repressive policies but rather through 
employment and economic satisfaction. In May 2011, the Saudi government created the 
Nitaqat program, which provided incentives for businesses to hire Saudi citizens. In the 
spring of 2012, Riyadh provided a year’s worth of pay to over one million Saudi citizens 
equal to $530 per month.282  
Unless Saudi Arabia can find a long-term solution for the current economic 
challenges that it faces, King Abdullah’s efforts might be short-lived. The April 2015 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook projected a 3.0 percent 
growth in GDP in 2015, down 0.6 percent from 2014, and the IMF predicts the growth 
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rate to be only 2.7 percent for 2016.283  While this change in growth rate is largely 
attributable to a rebasing of real GDP data to 2010, the IMF projects that the recent 
global decrease in oil prices will cause Saudi Arabia to experience “substantial deficit” in 
its current account balance in 2016, moving from 14.1 percentage of GDP in 2014 to -1.0 
percent in 2015 and rising only to 3.7 percent in 2016.284 While Saudi Arabia presently 
has the resources to support a global economy that is largely based on petroleum, actions 
of its competitors are driving the price of oil down, which means Saudi Arabia might 
have to explore other options other than simply pumping more money into its local 
economy and raising the salaries of its employees. For instance, the Saudi government 
might try investing in its people, not by increasing their pay but through emphasizing 
education and encouraging its citizens to transform its economy into one based on 
innovation and not one solely on natural resources.  
Riyadh has seemed to recognize that its petroleum-based economy will not 
support its population forever. The Saudi government’s recent push for nuclear energy 
reveals that it recognizes the finiteness of its natural energy resource, but the country has 
also recently made great strides in demonstrating its commitment toward innovation 
through an emphasis on education. One example includes the King Abdullah University 
of Science and Technology (KAUST), a graduate university 90 kilometers north of 
Jeddah. King Abdullah founded the university in September 2009, stating that it should 
act as “a beacon for peace, hope, and reconciliation and shall serve the Kingdom and 
benefit all the peoples of the world.”285 The university’s stated vision is to be a 
“destination for scientific and technological education and research. By inspiring 
discoveries to address global challenges, [it strives] to serve as a beacon of knowledge 
that bridges people and cultures for the betterment of humanity.”286 Research 
departments at the university include Biological and Environmental Science and 
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Engineering; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Science and Engineering; and 
Physical Science and Engineering.287  
Saudi Arabia’s plan for emphasizing education and incorporating technical 
innovation into its economy dates further back than the creation of KAUST, however. In 
1999, Riyadh issued a royal decree entitled The National Plan for Science, Technology 
and Innovation (NPSTI) in which the Saudi government instructed King Abdul-Aziz City 
for Science and Technology, the Ministry of Planning and other government and non-
government agencies to develop a long-term framework that would incorporate 
“programs and projects of science and technology . . . inserted into the operational plans 
of government agencies.”288 Programs like the NPSTI, the creation of King Abdullah 
University and other recent programs reveal that Saudi Arabia is attempting to shift its 
economy to one that will last by investing in its people through education and technical 
training.  
E. HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights issues continue to complicate the U.S.-Saudi security relationship. 
Many U.S. citizens and journalists criticize Saudi Arabia’s domestic policies regarding 
human rights, and this facet of the Saudi government has also crept into Washington’s 
dialogue of U.S.-Saudi security relations. The stated mission of the U.S. Department of 
State includes the intention to “create a more secure, democratic and prosperous world 
for the benefit of the American people in the international community.”289 Yet the robust 
economic and security relationship that the United States shares with Saudi Arabia seems 
to contradict this policy. Furthermore, the State Department openly acknowledges that 
Saudi Arabia fails to uphold the United States’ definition of human rights within its 
borders. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor’s “Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 2014” for Saudi Arabia accuses the Saudi government of the 
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following: “citizens’ lack of the ability and legal means to change their government; 
pervasive restrictions on universal rights such as freedom of expression…; and a lack of 
equal rights for women, children, and noncitizen workers.”290 The report also includes 
other instances in Saudi Arabia of “abuses of detainees; overcrowding in prisons and 
detention centers; investigating, detaining, prosecuting, and sentencing lawyers, human 
rights activists, and antigovernment reformists; holding political prisoners; denial of due 
process; arbitrary arrest and detention; and arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and 
correspondence.”291  
Professors at KAUST argue that by providing technical skills and scientific 
knowledge they are contributing to a gradual but definite transformation of Saudi society. 
In stark contrast to the rest of the country, KAUST “imposes no discrimination on the 
basis of sex, religion or ethnicity,” and, on campus, men and women are allowed to 
“mingle,” and women are permitted to drive.292 Many critics remain skeptical over how 
much scientific education programs can actually have on major issues facing the people 
of Saudi Arabia, particularly in the area human rights. Some argue that Saudi Arabia’s 
academic community must do more than simply teach science and math and that a true 
state-wide change can only be brought about by open criticism of the government.293 
Thus, far, the president of KAUST has remained silent on the recent Saudi arrest and 
harsh sentencing of political activist Raif Badawi for creating a political website. Raif’s 
punishment includes 10 years in prison and 1,000.294 Some of the university’s professors 
argue that true change can only be brought about through a slow process of education and 
research; many see KAUST’s inclusion of women as students as a major step toward 
achieving this objective. Other scientists at KAUST argue that human rights are a 
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prerequisite for scientific development, technology and creativity, and, if these things are 
to truly thrive in Saudi Arabia, as King Abdullah’s wished, Saudi Arabia must first 
address its human rights issues.295 
Riyadh’s relatively strict implementation of Sharia law not only affects its 
relationship its people, but it also has a detrimental impact on its security partnership with 
the United States. Public support within the United States for a strong U.S.-Saudi 
partnership is fairly weak. U.S. media and human rights activists in the United States 
continuously emphasize their discontent over the United States’ relationship with the 
kingdom, arguing that U.S. concerns for economic security and military defense have 
trumped efforts to promote global human rights.296 Even within Washington, members of 
Congress remain critical of the Saudi government for its repressive policies, accusing it 
of supporting religious extremism.297 While the United States has managed to overlook 
repression in the past when dealing with authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, as 
Saudi Arabia expands its economic partnerships and the United States decreases its 
dependency on oil imports, issues like human rights and political religious expression 
might play a stronger role in determining the course that the U.S.-Saudi security 
relationship may take in the near future.298 Human rights in Saudi Arabia remain a 
concern among both public activists and members of the government, but whether or not 
this concern will ever override other U.S. national security objectives remains unclear 
since it depends largely upon the greater economic, political and security environment of 
the two countries.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The issues confronting the U.S.-Saudi security relationship have changed since 
the 1960s. Although Iran has been a traditional rival of Saudi Arabia for centuries, the 
political situation in Iran is vastly different today than it was in the 1960s, and tensions 
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between Tehran and Riyadh are arguably much greater now due to Iran’s increased 
potential to possess nuclear capabilities. Some parallels could be drawn to Russia’s 
renewed regional aggression to the Soviet threat of the 1960s; however, today, Russia’s 
competition with the United States over political and economic influence in Saudi Arabia 
has replaced the ideological communist threat. While shared fears of communism helped 
strengthen the relationship between Riyadh and Washington in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
recent Iran talks are arguably pushing Saudi Arabia toward Russia, as evidenced in the 
recent nuclear agreements between the two countries. Like the threat of communism in 
the 1960s, radical Islamism serves as a mutual threat to both the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, which is helping to strengthen the security partnership today, despite all the other 
issues it faces. As the United States decreases its dependency on foreign oil, the 
significance that oil has played in the security partnership in the past becomes dampened. 
These four issues affecting the U.S.-Saudi security partnership—Iran, Russia, radical 
Islamism and oil—are directly tied to U.S. security interests in the Middle East to varying 
levels of degrees. If the United States is to take an analytical approach to U.S. foreign 
policy, whether fully or partially, these issues should play into the decision-making 
processes of Washington. Finally, while the aforementioned four issues directly affect 
U.S. security interests in the Middle East, human rights are an issue of ideology. Whether 
human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia should affect the U.S.-Saudi security relationship 
depends on whether Washington chooses to incorporate an ideological approach into its 
foreign policy.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper seeks to explain the origins and development of the U.S.-Saudi 
security partnership from the late 1920s through the early 1960s and determine how it 
helped the United States reach its security goals during this time. In the introduction, I 
hypothesized that, in addition to oil, geostrategic interests played a major role in the 
development of the early U.S.-Saudi security partnership. My research reveals that Saudi 
Arabia’s geostrategic value contributed to Washington’s decision to expand upon existing 
economic ties with the kingdom and incorporate it into U.S. national security strategy 
during World War II and the early Cold War. My findings and analysis also lead me to 
conclude that security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia helped the 
United States reach many of its security goals in the past. Moreover, this partnership 
proved productive regardless of whether the United States was using an analytical or 
ideological approach in its foreign policy. For example, cooperation with Saudi Arabia 
helped the U.S. exert its influence in the region during the Cold War, helping the United 
States achieve its ideological objective of communist containment. Additionally, military 
support for Saudi Arabia during the Yemeni Civil War helped the United States obtain its 
analytical objectives of maintaining regional stability and ensuring U.S. access to Middle 
Eastern oil. Understanding that security cooperation with Saudi Arabia can help the 
United States reach its security goals within the framework of both an analytical and 
ideological U.S. foreign policy strategy suggests that much value still exists in a 
partnership with the kingdom.  
A. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
There were two main reasons that U.S. presidents in the mid-twentieth century 
believed that Saudi Arabia’s geographic location could help them reach their security 
goals. First, by using Saudi Arabian oil, the United States could continue to fuel its 
military while adhering to the guidelines laid out in Roosevelt’s Foreign Petroleum 
Policy, which emphasized the use of oil in the Eastern Hemisphere to avoid depleting 
reserves in the West. Furthermore, the United States’ oil economy and its military 
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security during the mid-twentieth century could be considered separate sides of the same 
coin. The U.S. military depended heavily upon oil to fuel its weapons systems, and, 
during this time, the United States sought switch its oil source from domestic to foreign, 
which included Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia depended on the financial assistance 
and military protection of the United States. Second, Saudi Arabia provided a 
geostrategic advantage during the World War II and the Cold War. The kingdom’s 
proximity to supply routes during World War II and its location relative to the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War led these administrations to push for increased security 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Roosevelt’s Foreign Petroleum Act best highlights how 
these two drivers of the early U.S.-Saudi security relationship are immensely 
interconnected. Saudi Arabia’s value to U.S. security was not just about its oil or its 
location; combined, these two characteristics made Saudi Arabia the perfect partner for 
U.S. security interests in the Eastern Hemisphere. 
As U.S. foreign policy shifted its focus toward containing Soviet communism 
after World War II, the federal government continued to emphasize Saudi Arabia’s value 
to U.S. security through the Truman Doctrine, resulting in the construction of Dhahran 
Airfield and the creation of the USMTM. As mentioned in Chapter I, Norman A. 
Graebner’s argument that the U.S. officials took an ideological approach toward foreign 
policy after Woodrow Wilson’s presidency is true for the United States and Saudi Arabia 
during the mid-twentieth century. The polarizing effects of the Soviet Union’s 
antireligious communist doctrine helped unite the United States and Saudi Arabia against 
a common enemy, although religion served as more of a driving factor for Riyadh than 
Washington in this instance. Nonetheless, the Soviet communist threat continued to 
increase and enhance security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
after World War II. 
While President Truman made significant advances in projecting U.S. military 
power in the Middle East and Eurasia through Saudi Arabia’s cooperation, his presidency 
also marked the beginning of tensions between Washington and Riyadh. Truman’s 
forward leaning approach toward the Middle East incited Arab fears that U.S. Middle 
Eastern policy may have evolved into something no different than that of imperial 
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Europe. Increasing resentment toward the United States by the Arab world during the 
Eisenhower years and major events signifying that Arab nationalism had become the 
driving force in the Middle East led Eisenhower to adjust his foreign policy strategy near 
the end of his second term. Eisenhower’s early achievements for the United States such 
as the USMTM and Dhahran Airfield represent a strategy of military presence and 
deterrence against possible Soviet aggression. By the late 1950s, Eisenhower had come to 
believe that the best strategy for combatting communism in the Middle East would be to 
influence the Arab nationalists, and his administration sought to do this by seeking 
stronger ties with Nasser.  
President Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s plan to pursue rapprochement with 
Nasser. By the time Kennedy entered office, ideological components of the two 
countries’ domestic and foreign policies were posing serious challenges for the U.S.-
Saudi security partnership. For the United States, the ineffectiveness of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in Saudi Arabia drove Washington to center its foreign policy in the region 
around Nasser, King Saud’s rival. For Saudi Arabia, pressure from Arab nationalists 
drove King Saud to try to put diplomatic space between Riyadh and Washington. Neither 
President Kennedy’s nor King Saud’s efforts to put distance between their countries had 
a lasting effect, however. The magnetic draw that the Yemeni conflict had on countries 
both inside and outside of the Middle East strengthened the U.S.-Saudi security 
relationship because it gave the two governments no other option but to work together. 
Nasser’s actions in the conflict soured any of Kennedy’s attempts at rapprochement 
toward the Egyptian government, and barely a year had passed after the transfer of 
Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi government before U.S. military aircraft were once again 
based in and operating out of Dhahran, flying missions to defend Saudi Arabia from 
Egyptian aggression. Despite Kennedy’s attempts to relax U.S.-Saudi ties to pursue 
ideological objectives in the Middle East, his actions backfired, and Washington 
ultimately abandoned this strategy, albeit reluctantly, to protect its most valuable security 
partner in the Middle East at the time—Saudi Arabia. 
The United States and Saudi Arabia have shared both an economic and security 
partnership for longer than Israel has existed as a modern state. While the U.S.-Saudi 
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relationship began over petroleum, mutual security needs throughout World War II and 
during the early part of the Cold War brought the two countries significantly closer 
together. When President Kennedy and King Saud tried to loosen this bond in the early 
1960s, the Yemeni Civil War ultimately caused the security needs of both countries to 
trump any ideological goals that the two leaders might have had in the region, driving 
them to cooperate. President Kennedy originally hoped that Egypt, particularly Nasser, 
could be the new lynchpin for furthering U.S. interests in the Middle East, but when 
Nasser’s actions during the Yemeni conflict proved disappointing and contrary to U.S. 
policy, Kennedy had little other option but to offer support to Saudi Arabia. Likewise, 
King Saud tried to quell the complaints of Arab nationalists in his country by taking 
control of Dhahran Airfield and making it a solely noncombatant-aircraft airfield. Within 
just slightly more than a year of acquiring the airfield, however, the Saudi king implored 
the United States for protection against Egyptian aggression, and Kennedy responded by 
deploying eight F-100D fighter aircraft to Dhahran.  
B. TODAY 
Today, the U.S.-Saudi security relationship remains strong in many respects. 
Security cooperation between the two countries includes regular participation in joint 
exercises in or around the Gulf, the continuation of the USMTM, military sales and U.S. 
assistance in security infrastructure.299 Similar to the early and mid-twentieth century, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia share mutual concerns about external security issues, and 
it is these concerns that drive the relationship’s continuation. Several issues could affect 
the U.S.-Saudi security relationship in its present state. These issues include the Saudi-
Iranian rivalry, a resurgence of Russian influence in the Eastern Hemisphere, radical 
Islamism, changing economies and the role of human rights in foreign policy.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, the United States has demonstrated in recent years that 
it cannot only survive, but thrive on its domestic oil, both for local consumption and for 
its export economy. The boom in domestic oil production in the United States also 
                                                 




suggests that the reservations Washington once held over the depletion of domestic oil 
reserves seem to have largely fallen by the wayside. Such a change could give one pause 
as to why the United States continues to pursue a security relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
However, early diplomatic relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia reveal 
that U.S.-Saudi cooperation can result in more than just energy security. During World 
War II and the early phases of the Cold War, the two countries developed a security 
relationship through military cooperation that continues to this day. Despite early friction 
between the two states such as Congress’ suspicions of Saudi greed and Saudi concerns 
over U.S. imperialist motives, the geostrategic advantage that Saudi Arabia provided the 
United States and the financial and military support that the United States provided Saudi 
Arabia served the interests of both countries during the early to mid-twentieth century. 
While the political construct of the Middle East has changed since that time, many 
challenges to U.S. security remain tied to the region, including Iran, Russia and Islamist 
terrorism, and a strong continuing security partnership with Saudi Arabia could still 
continue to help the United States meet its current and future security objectives.  
The analytical approach toward foreign relations that George Washington and 
other early U.S. leaders advocated regarding alliances—that they should be temporary 
and serve a specific, national interest—applies to the U.S.-Saudi relationship today. 
While technically not an alliance, the partnership that the United States shares with Saudi 
Arabia can help the United States reach its defensive security goals for the same reason 
that it did in the 1950s and 1960s—geostrategic advantage. While a strong partnership 
with a Middle Eastern country might seem contrary to a defensive strategy for the United 
States, the global security environment of today is also markedly different from 1796. 
Refugee crises, modern travel, social networking and weapons capabilities have allowed 
regional Middle Eastern conflicts to extend beyond the Middle East. For the United 
States to ensure its own security, it must reach out and pursue cooperation with states in 
this region. Through a security partnership with Saudi Arabia, the two countries can 
continue to help each other meet their security goals.  
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C. THE WAY FORWARD 
The United States and Saudi Arabia cooperate in many areas other than security. 
Energy, education, citizen exchanges, science, technology, environmental and health 
programs are also a major part of U.S.-Saudi relations. Despite recent instances of energy 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Russia cited in Chapter III and other efforts made 
by Riyadh to vary Saudi Arabia’s energy program, the United States and Saudi Arabia 
continue to share a strong energy partnership. This partnership extends beyond oil now—
Saudi Arabia works with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, in addition to participating in annual energy talks, to help develop alternative 
sources of energy such as solar and geothermal energy.300 The United States currently 
has roughly 80,000 Saudi students within its borders, which is the highest number of 
Saudi Arabian students the United States has ever had at one time.301  In 2008, the United 
States and Saudi Arabia signed the U.S.-Saudi Science and Technology Agreement, 
which resulted in collaboration between the King Abdullah City of Science and 
Technology (KACST) and U.S. entities such as NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey. 
The United States and Saudi Arabia also work closely together in the field of medicine; 
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collaborate 
to conduct research on a broad range of medical topics, which include breast cancer, 
diabetes, heart disease and infectious diseases.302 
Today, one of the biggest tension points between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia is the issue of human rights as mentioned in Chapter IV. At some point, 
Washington will have to reconcile its stated objective of promoting human rights 
throughout the world to its continued military and financial support of Saudi Arabia. 
While cracks seem to be appearing in the strict policies of Saudi Arabia in cases like the 
KAUST, the State Department’s “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014” 
reveal that the kingdom still has a long way to go before it can be considered a desirable 
partner by many human rights advocators. Additionally, Washington must also 





understand that it cannot expect every country with which it cooperates to strictly adhere 
to the United States’ interpretation of how a country should be run at the domestic level, 
but, by the same token, the United States should refuse to tolerate glaring human rights 
abuses such as patterns of genocide and severe torture among its partners. This requires 
the United States to take both an analytical and ideological approach toward its foreign 
policy. Washington must decide at what threshold that it wants to hold its partners 
accountable for human rights abuses, but a threshold must exist. This thesis does not 
suggest that the United States should try to militarily enforce its domestic policies on any 
random country; however, the United States should disengage from those partners that 
exceed this chosen threshold after efforts have been made to curb these abuses. Further 
research and analysis could be conducted on how much emphasis the United States has 
truly put in both its dialogue and its cooperation efforts with Saudi Arabia in the area of 
reducing human rights abuses. 
Finally, regarding the promotion of democracy in Saudi Arabia, the United States 
should tread carefully. The House of Saud has often proven to be a friend of the United 
States throughout several conflicts in the Eastern Hemisphere, including cases presented 
in this thesis and in others as well. While Saudi oil might not be as critical to U.S. 
leaders’ national security strategy today as it was during the time of Roosevelt, Saudi 
Arabia can still play a crucial role in regional stability. The fall of several Middle Eastern 
regimes during the twenty-first century has resulted in chaos throughout much the region 
and created severe security threats not only for the United States and Saudi Arabia but 
also for much of the world. Thus far, the security relationship between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia has in many ways helped each country achieve their security objectives, 
and, as long as Saudi Arabia remains a strong state, the partnership can continue to 
provide this effect. While the political situation of the Middle East continues to unravel in 
countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains a kingdom of relative 
political unity and stability, as it has for nearly a century. To ensure a future partnership 
that allows both states to meet their own interests requires that both U.S. and Saudi 
Arabian leaders remember how past events relate and apply to the changing the face of 
global security today. 
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APPENDIX.  TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS 
Year Event 
1929 The Red Line Agreement is created 
1932 SOCAL strikes oil in Bahrain 
1933 Ibn Saud grants SOCAL first concessions 
1938 
SOCAL strikes oil in Dhahran; Ibn Saud grants company 440,000 square mile 
concession 
1939 
Anticipating World War II, Great Britain offers Saudi Arabia military 
protection 
1941 
CASOC appeals to President Roosevelt for assistance in meeting Ibn Saud’s 
financial demands 
The United States enters World War II 
1942 The United States opens legation at Jeddah 
1943 President Roosevelt incorporates Saudi Arabia into Lend-Lease Act 
1944 President Roosevelt articulates Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States 
1945 
President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud meet onboard USS Quincy 
President Truman enters office 
World War II ends 
1946 Dhahran Airfield is completed 
1950 President Truman enacts the 50/50 Agreement 
1951 The MDAA is created 
1953 
President Eisenhower enters office 
The USMTM replaces MDAA 
Ibn Saud dies; Saud bin Abdulaziz ascends the throne as King Saud 
1955 Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain sign Baghdad Pact 
1956 Suez Crisis 
1957 The Eisenhower Doctrine is declared 




President Kennedy enters office 
King Saud announces nonrenewal of Dhahran Airfield agreement 
The U.A.R. dissolves 
1962 
The United States transfers Dhahran Airfield to Saudi government 
Yemeni Civil War begins 
Egypt begins conducting airstrikes against Najran 
1963 
United States sends tactical fighter aircraft to Dhahran Airfield to support Saudi 
Arabia 
President Kennedy is assassinated 
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